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Geschichte und Historie

The Problem afFaith and Hi5tary

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN GESCf-/ICHTE AND /-/lSTORIL

The historical consciousness of the nineteenth century created new prob
lems for Protestant theology: how may the new historical science be a1 1 
plied to the Bible? How is faith to maintain its assurance ill the midst
of historical uncertainty?' These questions only intensitled when posed
with regard to the biblical witness to Jesus Christ and to Christian faith
in him. Already in the late nineteenth century, Martin K;ihler had at
tempted to circumscribe a sturlllfreies Gebiet (literally a "storm-free are,n
for Christian faith, an area into which the ambigUity and uncertainty of
historical criticism could not and should not penetrate. Kahler attempted
to secure this area by distinguishing between the historical Jesus and the
historic Christ, betl-veen the biblical picture of Christ and the portr'lit
provided by historical research. Others (e.g. Wilhelm Herrmann and
Wilhelm I3ousset) sought to answer these same questions by other means.
Their conclusions initiated a spirited discussion of the relationship be
tween faith and history, between the Protestant prinCiple ofjustitlcation
by faith alone and the modern science of historical research.
In a 1911 essay entitled Geschichte und Historic in tier
Religionswissenschaft,2 Georg Wobbermin revisited some of these ear
1. For some general discussions of tht: problem of faith and hislory ill Ihe llinckCl1lh
century, see Paulus, Colt in der Gesdlichte? Brachl1lJnn, Gh/libe lIIld Ge,dJlchte; IZohls,
Pmte,tan/ische Theologie da Neuzeil, vol. I; Welch, Prote,talll 1110Jlghr in the Nineteellth
Century; and HowJrd, Religion and the Ri,e o/l-li,lOricislII. For a mure general stuJy, s""
Harvey, The Historiall and the Believer.
2. Wobbermin, Geschichte
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Iier Jllell1l11S and 'lrgued for tbe use of a stricter, conceptual distinction
between C"sL'/licl/1I: Jnd I-!ist{)l'ic: in order to clarify faith's relationship
to Jesus Christ in light of modern historical consciousness, This essay
W;l$ prompted in part by Ihe recent publication of Arthur Drews's Die
CllristllSlIlytl/(.:,' in which Drews provocatively suggested that a "histori
c;ll" jesus or NaL<lI'eth never existed, Drews's radical conclusions sparked
inknse dehate in (;erman theological circles and pointedly raised the
question or the rel;\ti()nshi~l hetween faith and historical knowledge as a
question or u:nlr,ll significance for Protestant theology
l\ A, (;errish sketches the contours of the Christ-Myth debate
sparked hy Drews's hook in an article on Ernst Troeltsch's stand in the
deb,lle, (;c:rrish suggests that Drews's thesis was provocative, perhaps
even absurd, hut nonetheless important because it invited theologians to
reflect anew 011 Ihe question of faith and history, to ask the specific ques
lion olthe relev;lnce of the historical Jesus for faith'
In his study of C;t:sc!-ticJlte and Historie, vVobbermin accuses Drews
of ignoring the real and necessary distinction between the active and ef
ficacious picture of Christ within the Christian tradition on the one hand
and the results of historical criticism of that same tradition on the other
Drews railed to distinguish, in Wobhermin's terms, between the merely
historical Ihli~/3 flistol'iscfl] and the immediately historic [unmittelbar
gf!sl'ilidillidd,; By fai ling to make th is important distinction, Drews did
not t,lke account of the distinction between the historical Jesus behind
the New Testamenl, of whom very little can be known, and the picture
01" Christ found in the New Testament and in the Christian tradition
through to lhe present day

Drews did, in fact, acknowledge sLich a distinClion, but he concluded
that the distinction was irrelevant and that it only attempted 10 ignore the
problematical character of Christianity's claim to a historic fOLindat ion:

,3. In the (ore'''"ld tll Ihe first and second eJitions Drews aJJresses the aims of this
w"rk: "'thi, tc~t seeks to pruduce evidence that pretly much every trail of the picture of
the his(llrical Jesus, ,II least every imporlant trait of religiOUS significance, has a purely
mythical char,lCter anJ Ihere e~ists no reason at all to seek a historicalligure behind the
'Christ Myth:" Drews, Di~ Christl/smyth", xiii-xiv [ET (of the thirJ German edition): Th"
Cllrist 1\.1)'£1/, 191, He reservcs specific crilicism f'Jr tile representatives of liberal theology:
"It is in fael the fundamelltal error l1f lib~ral Iheology to think that the development of
the Christian church has IssueJ (rum a histurical inJiviJual - th~ man Jesus:' Ibid" 225
IEI',285-86\.
~,

See Cerrish, "jesus, iVlyth, anJ Histor),H

5, Wohbcrl11ill, Gesdlicl/te lilld Nis[urie, 2,
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The reference to history and the so-called "histori-:al continuity of
religious development" is obviously only a way out of ,I dillicu!ty,
, , As if there can still be talk of a "historic basis" where lhere
is no history, but pure myth l As if the "preservation or' histori
cal contilluity" could cOllsist in maintaining as history wh.1I are
mythical fictions, just because to thiS point they have p;1ssed fill
hislorical truth, when we have seen through their purel)' lictitiouS
and unreal character!O

Nevertheless, Wobbermin insists that a conceptual distinetir)n be
tween Geschichle and Historie will clarify the probleln that Drews raised
with such force, It is precisely to avoid throwing the historic picture of
Christ out with the historically murky bathwater that leads Wobhel'lnill
to make a stricter distinction between Geschichte and Historie,
As with any conceptual distinction, it is important to define the terms
as clearly and precisely as possible, In this particular case it is doubly im
portant, because, as Wobbermin candidly adl1lits, such a distinction is an
arbitrary one? lne terms Geschichte and Historie (and the correspond
ing adjectives and adverbs geschichtlich and historiscll) call be used in
terchangeably in most contexts with little wnfusion, Such an arhitrary
distinction can be justified and even demanded, in Wobbermin's opinion,
if it can be shown to provide tangible methodological benefits, such as
clarifying conceptual problems,S '1ne test of such an arbitrary distinction
is finally answered in the application of the distinction itself: will such a
distinction prove useful for theological work? If the anSlver is yes, then
such a distinction is justified, If no, then it must be abandoned in favor of
a more effective conceptual tool,
6, Drews, Die Christl/smythe, 232 rET: The Christ Myth, 293-941,

7, The arbitrariness of the distinction between Geschichte anJ fJistorie was not k'st
on l11an)' contemporar)' commentators, most notabl), Albert Schweitzer, who warned
that Wobbermin had ventureJ onto "Jangerous grounJ" wilh his insistellce Oil a slricler
distinction between the two terms: "He forfeits everylhing by executing his idca wilh a
play of artful distinctions, Nothing is hdpeJ by this, What is e~~enlial above all Ihillgs is
lhallheology employ clear language, Let your speech be ),es, )'es; IIU, no, An)'lhing 1I1llre
is of the Evil One:' Schweitzer, Geschichte der Lebel1-Jesli-ForscJ"'I/I~, 521 I ET: The Qliest
of the fJistorica/ Jeslis, 408],

R Wobbermin, Geschichte lind flistorie, 4,
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II is important to nole here that vVohherl11in did not invent the dis
tinctiLln hetween (;t:schil"!Jtt: and f-listorit:; Martin Kahler employed a sim
ilar distinLlion in his critique of the nineteenth-century "Lives ofJesus:'~
Kiihler, however, did nol attempt 10 arrive at a systematic or conceptual
understanding of the distinction between these terms. 111e distinction
remained for him an auxiliary conceptual aid, but it is Wobbermin
who elevates the distinclion to the status of a syslematic principle, and
Wohhermin uses lhe distinction to clarify the 1110st basic questions ad
dressed in his work.
Despite the arhitl'al'iness of the distinction between Geschichte and
llisloric, Wohherl11in attempts to prOVide precise definitions of both terms
fur the purpose of conceplual clarity. Because he intends to employ the
dislinLlioll as ~l systematic prinCiple and not merely as an auxiliary tool,
he must be ~lS precise as pOSSible in clarifying the meaning of his terms
,lilt! their interrelation.
-fhrougllOut his essay, Wobhermin continues to refine his definition
l)f Gt:schic!IIt:, so thai there are finally three distinct yet interrelated defini
tions, n'lmcly, Gt:schichte as what has happened in the past, Geschichte as
lhe realm of erJic,lcy or influence, and Geschicltte as the interrelation of
human hcings as spirilual-moral beings in their development.
The most b'lSic detinition of Geschichte is simply "what has hap
penni" [IV"S isl gt:sc!lL:hell or IVUS gescJlilh]. Any event that has happened
in the Pdst tlr any figure who has existed in the past belongs to Geschichte
and is d !jesdlidltlidlt; Emgllis or a geschichlliche GrojJe. Historie, by con
trast, is ,1 n,lITllWCf, more precise concept, which Wobbermin defines as
"investigated Ceschichle" [er!iJrschtt: Geschichte],10 meaning Geschichte
investigated with Ihe scientitlc historical method according to the canons
of 'lCademic historical research. Geschidltt: is simply given; Historie must
be acquired by scientitlc investigation.
'fhe gesdticittlich can potelltially confront anyone who stands within
history as d historic subject; Historie is accessible only to those with the
necessary scientific and intellectual tools to discover it. Geschichte is
prior to F-lislorie dnti is a broader category.11 Many events and figures of

Geschichte are lost forever to later generations who must rely on historical
research to reconstruct the past. Historie depends on sources (texts 'lnd
various artifacts) by which past events or tlgures might be reconstructed.
Without these sources, geschichtlich events or figures threaten to disap
pear forever. It is the task of the historian to discover and interpret texts
or artifacts in order to reconstruct the past. But the absence of sources
that would provide evidence for a past event or figure does not constitute
final proof that such an event never happened or that such a r-igure never
existed; it only means that such an event or tlgure cannot be reconstructed
by historical research.
Wobbermin further detlnes Geschicltte, however, in terms of influ
ence and signitlcance, or what he often calls effect or efficacy [Wirkung or
Wirksamkeit]. Past events or personalities are capable of intluencing the
future beyond their mere historicity, even if their historicity is question
able on purely historical-scientific grounds. 111is is especially important
in terms of the person of Jesus of Nazareth, who on purely historical
grounds is a shadovvy tlgure but who is also clearly a tlgure of profound
historic significance, influence, and efficacy beyond his mere historicity.
To put it more precisely, the efficacy of Jesus of Nazareth transcends the
mere fact of his historical existence. It is precisely this distinction between
mere historicity and protound historic efficacy and signitlcance that d
strict distinction between Geschichte and Hislorie is meant to clarify.
The realm of Historie is the realm of probabilit}!. Historians can de
termine the probability of their research achieving an aCCurate picture
of the past with relative certainty, but the results of scientific historic'll
research always remain relative and hypothetical. Whatever certainty is
gained by historical research is never absolute, but approaches only a
higher or lower degree of probability. This is not to say, however, that

II. 'these tcrms presenl siglli!icanl Jifliculties when attempting to capture anJ COII
vel' their Illealling in English. Uillike (~ermall. English has only olle nOUlI, "history:' allJ
Oldy <lne "clver!>. "historically." Like Cerlllan, however, English Joes have t\"O aJjectives

that can be used to inJicate the Germ~n Jistinction. But these English terms, like their
German counterparts, ~re usually useJ interchange~bly. Tr~nsJ~tors llf Iote ninetet'lllh
and twentieth-century theology h~ve gener~lly agreeJ upon the use of Ihe English dJjec
lives to correspond to the German ~djeclives. In most cases "historic,ll" corresponds 10
"historisch" ~nJ "historic" corresponds to "geschichtlich," anJ that is how rh,,'se lerillS
will be used in this study. See, e.g., Braalen, InlroJuction to The 50-celllt'cI l-/isloric,Ii
Jeslls arid the Historic Biblical Christ, by Martin Kahler, 21; Reid, "Tr~nslator's Note:' in
Troeltsch, The Absolute/less of Christianily, 2t; and Ashcraft, Rudolf BI/hl/Ullln, 35-3tl.
H. Richard Niebuhr altempts to express the same Jistinction in English wilh the ternlS
"inner history" anJ "ouler history:' or history as liveJ anJ history as seen. See Niebuhr,
The Meaning of Revelation, 31-47.
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(;eschie}lIl: oHers abs\)lule ccrtainty, or even necess<1rily a higher degree
of probability th,1I1 I-fistor;e. If this were so, Wobbermin suggests, Historie
would be an unnecessary nuisance and could be safely abandoned. In that
case, Ihe gO'll would be a Iota I separation of Gesdlichte frol11 Historie. 12
[)u t I his is not the C<lse, }-fistone se r ves the vi ta I pu rpose of re movi ng,
,1$ t~lr' ,1S possible. the uncertainty of the historic tradition and replacing
uncertainty wilh scientifically ensured results. Historie, as Wobbermin
deline'S il, ere~'[s wcll-detlned boundaries around Ceschichte and enables
gr,ldu,ltcd ,lcceplance of probability for the various data of the historic
traditioll. '1 his leads him to deline IJistorie more precisely as "scien
lifically claritied and rdined Geschichte."u According to this definition.
llisloril: serves as a limiting and ordering principle, investigating the
historic lr,ldit ion and presenting the results of its research as the highest
possible levd \)1' prob'lbility. As such, Historie is ,1 vital theological tool
,111L] pl'1YS ,1 necessary role within the Christian religion, precisely because
Christi,1nity is ,1 historic religion.
Christianity is a historic religion in at least three important respects.
hrst, Christianity is a historic religion because it is based on the life and
teachings 01' a historic ligure, Jesus Christ, in whom it apprehends the rev
elation of Cod, Second, Christianity is a historic religion because it refers
to a hist\lric docu ment, lhe New Testament, as the sou rce and norm for its
theolngical ref1ection, Third, Christianity is a historic religion because it
refers to its own history (biblical, liturgical, theological, etc) for guidance
dnd for resolll'ces for its continued development. In order to isolate the
truly historic elements within this long tradition, Wobbermin defends a
rigorous application of the historical method to the Christian tradition,

Here Wobbermin wants to draw a further distinction between the
historic tradition of Christianity [geschichtJiche UberlieJ~rllngl and the ef
fects or significance of that history in the present. Wobbermin insists that
the entire historic tradition of Christianity must be subjected to the most
rigorous historical research both in order to strip away false supports for
faith and to uncover or reveal the truly historic elements from th,1l trddi
tion. Geschichte in the sense of the hisloric tradition musl be subjected to
rigorous historical research in order to uncover or reveal those essenli,11
elements. But that research will never provide the effects oJ'lhose historic
elements; it will only uncover or reveal the essenlidl elements, 'nle ef
fects of those elements are always prior to historical research of the tradi
tion that carries them and independent of the results of lhat resedJ'ch. "
Christian faith, for Wobbermin, requires immediately ,wailable historic
effects rather than the secondary, provisional results of historical resedJ'ch
into the tradition. The historic tradition alone cannot serve dS the basis
of Christian faith because it always remains past. Il is the elt'eets of that
history, immediately present and eflicacious in the present. that serve as
the basis of faith. ls
Wobbermin also proVides a third definition of Geschichte based on
the philosophy of history of Heinrich Rickert, of which Wobbermin oilers
only a brief and cursory analysis in his essdy. According to Guy Oakes,
Rickert's project was largely an attempt to solve the hi/ltliS irrtlliotul!is be

12. W()bb~rlll in, c;,:sLI,id,1<: wltl I-list()ri~, 6.

13 ... ()i~ hijturi;c1I~ F"rsdllllIg diellt ja gerncle del1l Zweck, die Ullsicherheit del' ge
;lhid,clicl'~11 (.It:/lerliLjcrllllg lIL1cil Miiglichkeil Zli hehebm lIl1d dllrch wissellschaftlich

gesicllettc ~eslllt(/le

14, IhiJ., 6-7. 'nlis is Wobherll1in's opinion, but he Joe;; not "dJress Ihc' posslhility
that a rigorous historical criticism of these historic dements will p~rhaps (.11\ them inh>
question rather th"n confirm them. This is one of the major weaknesses of Wubb~f/Ilin:~
position. as it also is for K,ihler's and for Herrmann's.
15. Thi; further distinctiun between Geschichte and its WirkulIg ur \VirkSl//llk"il i, ,)
distinction that Wobherll1in himself Jocs not make explicit. but he do~s indicate such
a distinction, ever so briefly, when he allempts to distinguish betwe~n Gesd/ichte ,IS
Ober/ieJen/llg and the elfect or diic,lCy of Geschichte, its Wirkllllg ()f IVirkSilll,k,;i/: '''I h~
essence of'histury' namely is not exhallsleJ in the fact that il olTers the h"tnf/C traditiull
- tradition that heiOllgS to the past and that only has value for the presenl in its rec"lkct
ing what is past. No, history extends intu the present anJ w\lrks itself Ulit in the present
- anJ certainly not merely thfllugh inJiviJualtraJiliuns, hut rather through the fact of
history itself:' ["Das We;;en der 'Geschichte' ist nail/lid, lIichl dLll1lit lind dl/rill ersdlijl'ti.

es ,,150 die histori;che Forschllflg doch immer
brillgell vallIag, SO k<ltll1 sich die Geschichte
,lis so"h~. d.ll. lIaell tlnll Vorherigell die geschichtliche Ueberliej'emng, lIidlt iiber
da; t'Jll'L.'111I d,..,. I,istoflsclien Wahr;cheilllid,keitsuetmchtlilIg IIlId Wahrscheildich
keilsgeltill/g ahd'etl, SOli/tern sie 1111.1)1 1I0d, illIteI' diesel/I t'Jivelili verbleibell. Erst
all! die Hdhe
die I-lislune ahel)1 ues(illlllItL.' Bairke lIl1d Ge/liele da Geschichte
WiS"i'lIsl:haILiidler VI'<i1lrsLheilIlichkeitsbetrachtL/ng Will ermogliclit dll/nit j'iir die einulnen
Vc'Cell /111,1 Bescl/I/dteile der belrejle/lllell UeberlieJerungell eille II/lllllligfach llbgesillfte
\,\J,dlrs"lieill/icl,keitsgeltllllg. Die Historie isl <lIsa il'lsoweit die wissellschaftlich geklarte l/Ild
gereilligte G';;;fliid't,; - G,;schichte Iliill/licli iln Sillne Jer Gest'h;chtsiiberlie/erung:' lhid.

dafJ sie geschichlliche UeberlieJenll1g biew - Ueber/ietenmg, die da VCl'gilll~enll,;it illli:'"
hart WId Jiir die Gegenwart I1ttr dell Wert tier EI';nnen/llg all lIelgLlt/gelles IWI. t'Je;n die
Geschichte reicht in die Gegellwarl hinein Imd wirkt sich ill der G"gellwllrt IIIIS - ulIJ Zlt'tll'
nichl blofJ durch eil1u/ne Ueberliefenll1gell, sondei'll tlwd, dell Tlllb"stLlII<I Jer Gesdlidile
selbsl."]lbiJ., 7. This Ji;tinction between Geschichte as ",hat remains p'bl anJ the efrect
or efficacy of Geschichle ,,,ill be Jiscussed in more Jetail below.
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\ween concepl '\l1d re,11 it y by means of a chai n of reason ing with five links.

science, for Rickert, is about value and about reality as it is eXllerienced
rather than about reality in se. In other words, histl)ricJI science has il
phenomenological rather than an ontological b;)sis.l~
Rickert does not distinguish between Geschicilte and Historic ,IS
vVobbermin uses those terms, but vVobberl11in nevertheless believes thill
his distinction Iinds support in Rickert's work. While there is a plausible
con nection between vVobberl11 in's understand ing of Gesellililte and
Rickert's understanding of the uniqueness of historic individuals dnd of
the importance of development and the interrelation of past ligures 'lIld
present individuals in terms of the value of past figures for the present,
it is a very slim connection, and Wobbermin does not give an adequate
defense of his claim to have found support in Rickert's work,~'1
vVobbermin claims to have arrived at a third delinitioll of (;esdlicllte
on the basis of his reading of Rickert, but his just'ilication fl)r a Rickertian
basis never achieves the clarity necessary to make a judgment on its
merits as a faithful interpretation and application of Rickert's philoso
phy of history. Nevertheless, he claims to have achieved a third delinilion
of Geschichte on the basis of Rickert's work, namely Gesell/eilte as "the
interrelation of human beings as spiritual-moral beings in their develop
ment." And again, "the interrelation of spiritual-moral individuals con
stitutes Geschichte - their interrelation, however, in its development. For
the element of development also belongs to the essence of Gesellicilte."21

'1 hese live links are a thcory of the phenomenology of reality, a critique

of episl<:mologicli re,1! ism, a I hel)ry of (()gnitive interests and a theory of
concepts, ,1n ,Inalysis of the limits of concept formation in natural scicnce,
a III I ,\ dem,lrcli ion criterion for distinguishing natural science from his
torical or cultur,JI science H , It is to one part of this Iinal "link" in Rickert's
ch.\in of re,1Soning Ihat VVobhermin (1ppears to turn for support of his
final ddillilion or (;csc/tic!lte as the realm of value and as the interrelation
of hun1<111 heings as moral-spiritual beings in their development, and the
key 10 this delinitionlies in Rickert's underslanding of value.
Accllrding I,) I(ickert, the IheoretiC<11 interest of historical science
IS J"(Hlled in the value historians ascribe to the individual as a unique
historic entity. 'I he u)nccpl of value enables historians to distinguish
hetween import,lnl nr valuable historic ligures and the great mass of all
other historic '·Igmes. Without such a distinction historical knowledge
wLluld be imflossihle, because of what Rickert called the "extensive and
\lltensivc intinily of reJlity."\7 This is one of the important distinctions
belween the n,1Iura! sciences lNaturwissensc!wften] and the cultural sci
ences \C;(;/slL'sw/,i,ielbc!/(lfiell!. The natural sciences, according to Rickert,
.Ire c,1I1cerned with the general and the universal, while the cultural sci
ences (including historical science) are concerned with the unique and
the individual. Hist,)riC<11 science is not ultimately concerned with the past
for the sake of the p,1st, but for the sake of the present, namely in terms
uf a \',1Iue-relation I Wertbeziellllllg] hetween the past and the present and
in terms of history's essential characteristic of development.l~ Historical

that "brings to expression the logical essence of historic,tI ,ck'lce" Jild Ilile Ihal further
develops the principlc of value- relalion. Rickert, Die Cren:::el/ del' I/c!Cllrll'is.<Cl/sdltl/i/i..hcl/
Begriff;bildLll1g, 396.
19. Oakes," Rickert's Theory of Histllrical l< nowledge," xvii.

[6. Oake" "[<ickl'rt', 'thl'ory of Historicdl Kno,\'Iedge," xvii.
17. 'Ihl' l'xkmivl' Infinity 01 rl',llity concerns the endless 1'lIlendlichl anJ the un
surl'l'yahk [lIl1iilh.:r;cldll1r! chdracter of reality, Reality IS IIl1el1dlich insofar as it cannot
he I'xh,lllstively incurporated into our experience, and il is II/ltiber;ehbar insofar as it is
nll!-,os,ihk lu surl'c'y Ihl' whuk "I' reality. 'fhe Intensive innllil)' of reality, on the other
hand, Cllncerns thl' individual. 'I hI' composite l'kments of each indiviJual event or figure
arl' unlilllilcli in prinl'ipk. anJ l'very event or figur~ can possess an intinite number of
a,pl'ets. I(il'kl'rl ""1Hllarizes these daims by del1ning reality ,IS fundamentally irrational,
Ille,nling lhal lhac IS nu criterion lin deCiding 'vhJt wllulJ qualify as complete knowl
edgl' ot'thl' whole or ufthl' inJ,vidll,11 JSp~cts. But l(jck~rl claims thJt this description of
re.t1it), as II'raliol"t1 i, a phl'nllJllCnological rather than an ontological dailll, It concerns
our l'xpl'l'il'ncl' 01' rl'.t1ily rather than r~Jlit)' ill ;e, Rickert, Die GreJIzell der lIa/unvi;
S/.'IISc!lIItili tl,ell l3c:gritf;/Jiltlllllg, 31--15 See JISll Oakes, "Rickert's lheory ot Historical
KIHlI"kdgc:," n'li,
IH, I{ickert dl'scribes Ihe cl)nCepl o(developl1l~nt IElllwickJlIllg;begrilil as the concept
22

20, In fact, Wobberrnin's treatmenl barely scratches the surfaCe' of RiLk<:rt's wurk,
anJ he appears to Jraw only one substantial conclusion from hi, r~ading 'If l{ickl'rL,
namely that cultural value is intimately related to the spiritual-morallik, Unf,'rLunatcly,
Vv'obbermin fails to proviJe a sutlicit'nt justificatil)ll for this conclusi'Jn, Jnd he due, 11Ilt
refer to any of Rickert's own texts to support that specilic claim. He dol'S claim Ihat IllS
third anJ final definition of Ge;chichle is bas~d on Rickert's "'ork, but hI' fails 10 giVl' any
evidence that this is the case. It is difficult to determine why, Ih~n, W"bbl'rmin founJ \I
necessary 10 engage Rickert's work al all. See Wobberrnin, Ge;cllichle IIl1d l-li;lori~, 7·-t~,
21. "Ceschichte ist cloch letz{id, der ZlIsallllllellllclllg cla tHell;chell <1/'; gei;lig';ltlhcha
Wesell ill s~iller Enlwick/lIlIg. .. , Der ZII;i1i11l1lellhdllggei;lig-sitrlicher We;ell 11/;0 s/t'II! die
Geschicht~ dar. /hr ZU5ammenhallg aber ill ;e;lIer En/wi(k/lIl1g Dellll all"" cia; t"olI/elll
der EHlwickhmg gehdr/ Will We;cn der Ge;chichle." Ibid., l-1. Wobb~[Jnin's lldinition
does have a Rickertian basis insofar as it appropriat~s Rickerlian Ierminlllugy, hUI bl'
yond this semantic or cOllCeplual similarity there is little substantial engagcllll'nt wilh
Rickert's philosoph)' of history.
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CL':5c!ticlttc, I hen, is not merely what is past and static. Rather, it is the realm
or inter rdal io n <\Ild development, 0 f conti nuing efficacy and value, wh ich
pnsisls ,111(1 eXlcl1ds into lhe present. Cese!tiehte is not a closed system
but a livillg pro(ess dnd d present relation of individuals to one another
<llHlto the past.·' he eillbodiment of spiritual-moral relation, Wobbermin
suggests, "is the constitutive essential feature of Cescllieftte.""
lfllim<llc1y it is the concepts of relation and value that serve as the
mosl important <Ispeds of this third dehnition of Geschichte. Value, espe
(ially Ihe value of the historic pi({ure of Christ, is an important concept
for Wobberl1lin; IHlwever, it is often simply collapsed into the concept of
the elleets or etli(Jey of that picture. The concept of relation will become
more impol·tant in vVobbermin's "religio-psychologica\ circle:' which
fmms the basis of his religio-psychological theological method and
whi(h he constructs on the basis of his distinction between Geschichte
anJ Ilisforic.
Having arrived al three definitions of Gesdtich/e, it is now necessary
10 review these definitions of Geschicllte and Historie and the distinctions
and relationships hetween them. In his opening section \Nobbermin be
gillS by offering a hasic definition of Gesc!tichte as simply what has hap
pened, or what is past. He then refines that definition to emphasize the
ellee!> or eflicacy of historic events and figures, and finally he expands
the Jdinilion of Gt:sclticftte to emphasize the concepts of interrelation,
development, and value. All of this, then, is opposed to Historie, which is
defined as lhe scientific illvestigation of CesL/liehfe and the results of that
investigation. !lis/orit: serves the purpose of erecting boundaries around
C;csc!licll/C:, to separate what is historic from what is not historicY What

is historic, though, is not limited by or confined to Historic:. 'TIle historic
will persist beyond and sometimes even in spite of the results of histori(al
research both by virtue of its primacy - Historie, Wobbennin mJintains,
always retains a secondary character to the primdcy of (,'esdlldttc - 'llld
by virtue of its signihcance.
Here it is necessary to introduce a further distinction, one that
Wobbermin himself did not consciously or explicitly make. It is neces
sary to Jistinguish between Historie, Gescftidlfe, and the ellect or elilc<!cy
(Wirkung or Wirksdmkeit] of Geschicftte. 24 Geseftic!tfe is subject to his
torical research, to Historie, which produces sCientihcally ensured results.
These results, however, can never serve as the foundation of Christian
faith because they always remain secondary qua results. Wh,ll is primary,
for \Nobbermin, is the effect or efficacy [Wirkung or Wirksoll1kcitj of
Geschichte, of an historic hgure or event that always precedes and tran
scends historical investigation.!S That effect or efficacy cannot be proVided
by historical research and cannot rest 011 Historie, however vigorously
prosecuted. It confronts individuals directly in and through Gesdlidlfc
and is immediately available to religious experience. In this sense, then,
the historicity or the historical verihability of a past event or figure is ul
timately irrelevant, or at least secondary; the effect of thal historic event
or figure is primary.
One passage in particulM provides support for this further distinc
tion. Wobbermin suggests that the "historic fact" of Christ exists apart
from and prior to faith, but that it also includes within it a presupposition
of faith and therefore can only be effective or efficaCiOUs for faith:

22. "Dcr 11I".:,;ri(f dIe,er gei,cig-,illficllell Beziehungell, die den ZusLl/llmel/hang
cia "{cl/,,Id/cil ali g<lllza gnv<il/rleiilel/, iir die kOl/slilllierende ~Veiemlllerkl1lat der
G':iclIlCJIlC." Ihid., 15 .. , his cOIl<:epl of relation Ivill become much more important in the
(O,HeXI 01 Wohhcrtlllil'S reli~io-psydHllogicalcircle between present individual religiOUS
espcricm:c ~l1d hisloric Llcts. ·lhe rehgio-psychological circle will be discussed ill more
del,lil [11 thc follmving ch~pler.
2.~. ~krc It docs appe,lr that Wohbermin is granting a mor~ positive role to Historie
Ih.ln pcrh.lps he is Willing 10 admil. If Hi,lorie is capable of separating the truly historic
from thc broader tr~dilion of Christianity, it is performing a necessary positive function.

primary reality. That prior, primary reality (i.e., Geschichte, and nHlre spl'cifil-ally the'
efJects or efficacy of Geschichtc) is the foundalion of faith.
24. Wobbermin does reftT 10 c::rfect or etiicac)' in his second delinilion of Geicltichte,
but in the remainder of his essay effect or efficacy functiolls as a third calegory, dislillCI
from both Historie and Gescltichte.
25. It is tempting to label this third e1emcnt as "Wirkungsgeschichk:' or "histe'r}' of
effecls" (generally of a text or work of arl). Hans- Ceurg (;adamer, for example, con·
siders the concept of Wirkllngsgeschichce to be essential fur hermeneutics, and it is in
the Cllntcxt of Wirkllngsgeschichte that he develops his cOllcept of a "fusion of huriwns"

Ih.H faith in [/(j w~y depends on the results of hislnrical research. But Historie can playa
ncccssMy and even pu,itiv\: role in establishlllg Ihe founddtion fen faith withuut thereby
1''''ll/lllllg that fOUlld,llioll. It is, as Wohbermin puts it, second-order reflection 011 a prior,

IHo,-izoncvasch,lIe!wngl. See Gadamer, Trllth alld /\;Icthod, 300-7 [1 he origin~1 Gerill~n
is available as WahrJteiclimi Mechode\. In Wobberrnin's unJcrslanding of the rdaliunship
between Geschichle and its dfects or dhcacy, however, this purdy htTilleneutical scnse is
missing. ln this case "geschichtliche Wirkung" or "die:: Wirkung der C;cschichte" rdlects
his intentions more precisely than "Wirkullgsgeschichte" ill Cad,uller's sense, panieu
larly in light of the lack uf any attention 10 hermeneutics as such in Wohbermin's ess~y

24

25

Wohherillill duc> gr,lnt ,I p'lsitlvc relationship of Historie In Geschicl/te at other points
ill thiS ess,ly, hUI he ahvays Lju<Iiilies his determination of this role with an insislc::nce
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'Ihe hI stori c faLl ,li so exists co mpletely apart from faith. But th e
hi storic 1 ~ld as such also includ es within it a reference to a pre ~lJ Ppositioll of faith Ih ,lt is dncacious in it, and it call theretore
bcc'(lllll' dli cclcious only for tilith .'"

Wobbermin's appeal for a stricter conceptual distinction ." In thi s eSS<ly
vVobbermin offers appraisals and critiques of four significanl alkmpts to
solve the problem o ffaith and history, those ofGotthold Ephraim Le ss illg ,
Martin Kahler, Wilhelm Herrmann, and Wilhelm Bousset. By itllcrprc'ting what he considers to be the se minal text s Oil the prohlem of faith
and histor)! as it relates to a distill c tion between Gesciticille and fii5toril',
Wobbermin hopes to discover where he can build on the strengths and
perhaps improve upon some of the weaknesses of these earlier elt"orts.
An analYSis o fWobbennin's own critique of lhese pre violls f1os ition s \\,i11
show where vVobbennin was able to move the di sc uss ion fo rwdrd <Inti
where he became ensnared in similar or unique difficultie s.

In terlllS () f the relationship between faith and histo ry, it is the immedi ately available elrcct or the efficacy of the hi storic picture of Christ,
ullc()wred tlr I'eveal ed hy histori cal research bUl not de pendent on the
resullS of th :lt rese,lrch qlla resulls or produ ct of that research, that awakells 1".1 it h inCh ris!. ' I he pe rson of eh rist is a fact of Geschichte, and as
such is opell to th e full r ~lngl' o f hist o ric al rese<lrch. But il is always prior
to rii .-; Io ri(' a nd ill that sens e remains independent o f it. B)I distinguishin g
hctwel' ll C('.'(lticitl(' and its ellecls or effi cacy, and by further distinguish ing thOSe elleds frol11 historical investigation of Geschicltte, Wobbermin
belie ves it possi hle to maintain a necessar)' ro le for historical research
without thereh y nuking faith d e pendent on its resulting portrait of JeSllS
Christ. Wobberl11in him self did not explicitly draw this distin c tion between C;esdticltle a nd il S WirkulIg or Wirks,JlIlkeil, but if su ch a distincti o n pro ves helpful ill dMifying "vVo bhermin's position it will have proved
its lls efuI11e %.
Ha vin g estahlished his definitions of Geschichle and Historie, in the
second section of his essa y \Vobbermin turns to earlier effo rts to solve the
prnblel11 o fCaith and history. LlCh of these attempts, Wobbermin suggests,
shares Illuch ill common with his own attempt to solve the problem. But
he cll l1tends that his distinction between Geschichte and Historie moves
him close r to a soluti o n than these pre vious attempts by more clearly
identifying the problem a nd by prov iding a more defensible solution.

WOBRERI'vIIN'S APPRAI SAL AND CRITIQUE
OF PREVIOUS PO SITIONS
Wobb e rl1lin did not in ve nt the distin cti on between Geschichte and
f1l510ri('. CI he explicit di stinction had already been made by Martin Kahler
in 1892, and olhers were making similar distinctions hetween hi story as
what is pasl and history as modern sc ientifi c historic al research before

Gotth old Ephraim Less illg
In his study o f Lessing, Gordon Michalson, Jr., descrihes th e ill1p<l c t of
Less ing's famous "ditch" on the centuries that followed:
An im age or a metaphor, although introduced almost casuJll y,
sometimes tJkes on a life of" it s own, insuring a Illeasure ot" im mortality for its inventor.... Lessing 's "ugly dit ch," if not the 11I0st
frequentl y cilt'd nonhiblical image within Prot es tant theology
during the past two centuries, is certainly in the running for rhat
dubious title. ~s
Despite the near ubiqUity of "Lessing's d itch" ill subsequent Pro testant
theology and the myriad efforts lo leap it, IV[i c halson detects a persistent
misunderstanding or simplifi cation of Lessing's own presentation in his
brief polemical letter, On the Proof of the Spirit and o.f"Power. In that text,
Mi chalson argues, Lessing does not present one "ditch," but three.
The first ditch in Lessing's letter is whal Michalson calls the "temporal-factual ditch;' the great historical distanc e between, for example,
miraculou s events occurring in the first century CE and the present.

26. "Die geschicll/liche Tel/Seiche /Jesteht durchaus aucil abgesehm VO Il Glal lb el"!. A bt',- die
geschichtlicllt: Tuisa cile schliej]t allt:rdings als solelle den Hir/1veis auf eill e ill ihr wil"ksarne
Glu II/J ell svolClu S).;tz lIllg ill sic/r, Wid sit: komi demgemiij3 atlch IIUI" pir den Glallben .
wirk;alll .verdell ." \,y"bbn lllill, Gesdlich te //lId Hist orie, 27.

Rei schk "Der Streit tiber die Begrlilldung Jes (;lauhellS ,1lIf tim 'ge Jesus Chri stus." Se~ also Frcsen ius, -'Die: Bedeutung del' (;eschichtl lchkcit
J ~S ll fUr J~1l Glallben" for a use of this Jistinction oy one of Wobberill in's clllltelllf!llfaries.
Freseni1l5, for example, makes explicit what remains merely illlf)li cit ill Wubhnll1ill's essay,
namely the Jistincti on between Geschichte and its Wirkullg or Wir!.:slllilkeit. i'reselliu s.
"Die BeJwtung Jer Geschi ch tli chkeit jesu," 258. GorJnn Rupp brielly sketches tbe (Olltours of the Jebare conce rning rhe distinction between Gescilichte and Historit: ill th e
t 9105 in a chaprer entitleJ "Christ anJ Cult." See Rupp, Cllltllre-Protestalltislll, 25--32.
28. Michalson, Lessing's "Ugly Ditch," l.
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27

27. S~e , e. g.,
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Lessillg Ill,lkes d distillction between first-hand experience of an event
and seC<Jlld ,halld knlJwledge of that event hased on testimony: "Miracles
Ih,l! I see wilh my own eyes, and have an opportunity to test, are one
thing; miracles of which I know only historically [Ilistorisch) that others
claim to have san and tested them are another:"" 'Tne historical distanCe
between the p,ISI evenl ,lI1d the present invariably weakens that event's
pOlver 10 convillce because it is now being mediated through any number
of persons or illstitutions, L.essing asks, "Is what I read in credible histori
,1I1S invdri,lhly JUSI as cert,lin for me as what [experience myself? I am not
,1Wdre that dnyonc h,ls cver made such a clailll,"i o
Hlllvcver, ,\$ Ivlichdlson suggests, Lessing's first, "temporal-factual
ditch" is in Llct a ''red herring:' beC<lUSe the issue for Lessing is not primar
ily factual bUI logical. Historicli reports are unreliable, not for any factual
reaSt)J], but hecHlse they cannot be demonstrated logicllly, As Lessing
puiS it, "ff no historical truth [Izistorische Wa!lrheit] can be demonstrated,
then IWlhing C,1Il be demonstrated by mealls of historical truths. TI1dt is,
tlcdt/cntlll IrLlIlls of lustory [GeschichtswahrheitellJ can never become the
pwu!u!lIecessllry I rut Its o!retlSOII."JI Th is Leibnizian 11 distinction between
contingency ,1 III I necessity (what Lessing actually calls the "broad, ugly
ditch"") is wh,lt Michalson calls the "metaphysical ditch;' the problem
of two chsses of truth (i.e., historical truth and religiOUS or metaphysical
trut h). AlId it is th is sh i t1 from [he lemporal- factual to the metaphysi
cal lhal IllClrks the tr,lIlsition to the heart of Lessing's argument. In this
section, Lessing asks how he is to accept as true the claim that Christ is
lhe Son of C;od on the basis of his resurrection from the dead. Lessing is
willing to accept as true the fact that ksus proclaimed himself to be the

Son of God and that his disciples also claimed this 011 the b<lsis of the
resurrection of Jesus from the dead, because, Lessingadmils, he h,1S no
serious historical objections to the resurrection. TheseJaims concern the
same, historic<ll class of truth.
The "metaphysical ditch" is encountered when tll;:se historical, (011
tingent truths are made the basis of religious or ratiorill necessary Iruth.
Lessing continues:

29 I cssing. "Uehe'" den 13,'v'/ei, de, Ceisles unJ Jer Kraft:' 3 [ET: "On the Proof of
the Spiril anJ o( Power," 8-11.
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IIJIlI, S WI', (lSI

31, Ibid, ":Illph:"i, in origin,,1

32. Toshin,asa Yasukata notes Ihat Lessing b<lrroweJ this Jistinction between truths
01' history anJ truths o( rcason from a similar dislinction Jrawn by CotlfrieJ Wilhelm
I.eibniz bct IVe'en truths of reason [verites de IWSOllnement or Vemwiftswahrheitell J anJ
f.l<:tll"llrulhs I verites tie jllit or TatsachemvCl!lriIeilClll. 111e distinction, f,x Leibniz, resteJ
on the di,llndlon bel ween illlpo"ibiliry anJ possibilil)': "Truths of reason are necessary
alld their oppo,ite is impossible; f.lClual truths arc c<lnlingent anJ their opposite is 1'05
,ibk." !.elhniz, cited in Ya"ukata, Les:illJ{s Pllilo:iupiIy of Religiull, 60.

33. !.e,;sing, "Ueber den BelVeis Jes Geisles unJ dn Krati," 7 lET: "On the Proof of
Ihe SllJril anJ "f Power:' 871.
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But to make the leap from this historical lrulh Iilis/ori:icltell
Wahrheill into a quite different class of tl'uths, and D I't'cjllire 111<'
to revise all my metaphysical and moral concepts acordingly; to
expect Illt' to change all Illy basic ideas all the l1,ltUfC of the deity
because I cannot ofier an)' aedible evidence against he resurrec
tion of Christ - if this is not a iJET0(30015 E1s' aAAo yivos' [transi
tion into another category), I do not know Wh;lt Ar~lotle Illeant
by that phraseJ'1

TI1is distance between two classes of truths is the 'broad, ugly ditch"
that Lessing claims to be unable to leap. By surveying this ditch <lnd by
mapping its terrain, its breadth and its depth, Lessing ,Iltroduced some
thing nove! into Western religiOUS thought. AccordinglO Hemy AliisOll,
"Lessing was the first thinker to separate the question of Ihe Iruth of the
Christian religion from the question of its historical 'oundation.";' Or,
to put it even more boldly, Lessing's argument cOllstilLies "lhe conlplele
elimi nation of the historical from religion."\~
As Michalson suggests, however, Lessing is perfectly comfort
able making his home on the "necessary" side of this ditch, because for
Lessing the truth of Christianity is ralional and, if not antihistorical, at
least unhistorical in nature J7 1ne first ditch, the tempot-al-factual ditch,
becomes irrelevant for Lessing precisely because the trUlh of Christianity
finally has nothing to do with history at all. Or, as Ivlichalson notes, for
Lessing Christianity is true because of its rational, "inn:r" truth and not
because of its historical facticity.J8 For Lessing then, (.nly the lIIeanillg
of Christianity can be conveyed by history, never its il'lltll. Its truth is
34. IbiJ, 7

lET, 87].

35. Alli$OIl, Less;rlg emtl the Enlighrenmwt, viii.
36. This is the juJgment of GOltfried Fittbogen, ~itl'J in Alli"ln, Les:iillg Will Ihe

Enlightenment, 103,
37. Michalson, LeS:iing's "Ugly DitciI," 12.
38. IbiJ., 32.
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necessary <\lId rati(liwl rather than contingent and historical. Michalson
sumlll<JriLes Lessing's posilioll in terms of the illustrative power of history
and the rationell essence of Christian faith:

'TIle Christian religion is true, then, insofar as it expresses this inner,
rational truth that is immediately available to nltion,ll hUf11,1I1 beings. It
is not true on the basis of historical demonstrations, or on the basis of
the testimony of the apostles or the evangelists, or 011 the basis of the
Christian tradition or the authority of the church. ll)is is so because, as
Lessing puts it in his famous "metaphysical" ditch, "accideillal truths of
history can never become the proof of necessary truths of re'lS011."<\

lIlIil1l;lIely, lhen, Lessing's position on t'aith JnJ histo['ical knowl
edgL' is derived lrom Illore fundamental COlllnlitnlents concerning
(ailh and reJS<ln on til<: one hand, and re;lson and revel'ltion on the
olhCl ,1lIlhelllic t'aith is ratiO[l;li and potentially universalizable,
llle,lI1ing lh,1l il docs nOI hang on the acceptance 01 any historical
(aL'ts; Jilli hisloric.li revelations Jo not introduce n<::w and indis
1 <::nsahk religIOUS inforJllation but simply illust['ate, or hring inlo
'
our ti,'ld o!visinll, whJt we J['<:: capable oFkno\ving all along J9
'I here is, however, yet <mother "ditch" ill Lessing's letter. This third
and llnal ditch is what Michalson calls the "existential ditch" or the
prohlem of religious appropriation, and he suggests that this ditch is the
common theme rUllning through the entire letter. It is the problem of a
modem paSOll dpproprialing and believing a message that is strange, in
credible, and perhdps even scandalous. In this context Lessing is particu
1,lrly concerned with the autonomy of the rational human being, and he is
unwilling 10 sacrifice lhal autonomy in order to believe a message solely
on the bdsis of the duthorily of Scripture, church, or tradition, For Lessing
it is ultimately d Illdtler 01 distingUishing between the "outer" (e,g., his
torical events) dnd the "inner" (the autonomous, moral-religious self).'IO
I.essing's preference for the "inner truth" of Christianity over against its
extemal, historical foundations or "proofs" marks the first time in the
West that '·the questi<.)Il of the faeticity of the Christian revelation was
held to be irrelevant for the truth of the Christian religion."<1 As Lessing
claims in respollSe to Hermann Samuel Reimarus,
. The
The ktk[' is not the spirit, and the Biole is not religion.
rdigi<ln is not true beclllse the evangelists and the apostles taught
it, but they laughl il b<::cause it is true. The ~vritten traditions must
be nplained accorJing to their inner truth, and no written tradi
tion Cdn giv<:: it an)' innn lruth iF it has none,<~
39. Ihid, 39. U>sing's rdcrences to Ihe iltustrJlivc power of history will be adopted
hy KJnl and IJtCl' r('worked hy W"hberillill, who, surprisingly, do('s nOI refer to this de
Illelll "f I.c"illg's Ihnllgh!.
'10. tbid., 4H-~9.
41 ..A.lli"lll, Lesslllg ,.md Ihe Eillightellillent, 96.
42. I.e,sing, cited in Allison, Lessing ullli tile Enligilletll>lent, 95-96.

Wobbermin's Appraisal and Critique of Lessing's Position
In introducing the section in which he appraises previous positions on
the problem of faith and history, Wobbermin notes that he is pllIposely
selecting positions with which he finds some level ofagreemenl.'< He ,llso
admits that Lessing does not belong directly to the group that folluws,
primarily because Lessing is not, strictly speaking, a Protestant theolo
gian. Wobbermin's critique of Lessing will therefore be of a more general
character than those that follow.
Lessing's famous "ditch" plays an important role in subsequent
discussions of the relationship between Christian faith and history, and
Wobbermin restricts his comments to this one sentence of Lessing's Ieller
On the ProDfof the Spirit and of Power. There is nothing in Wobbermin's
analysis to indicate that he appreciated any of the nuances in Lessing's
presentation, or that he was aware of the possibility that more than one
"ditch" is being discussed. Everything hangs on Lessing's one sentence:
"Accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary
truths of reason,"<s
Wobbermin suggests that Lessing's "ditch" suffers Irom certain con
ceptual ambiguities, most importantly in terms 01 the relationship be
tween truth and history. Such conceptual ambiguity can be eliminated,
Wobbermin offers, by reframing Lessing's statement with speCific refer
ence to the distinct ion between Geschichte and Historie, rows Wobberm in
would restate the proposition to read: "Individual historical cognitions
can never become proof of eternal truths of Geschichte."·'6
43. l.essing, "Ueber Jen Beweis Jes Geisles und Jer Kral1:' 5 [FT: "On the Proof of
Ihe Spirit and of Power," 85].
44. Wobbermin, Geschichte Wid Historie, 16.

45. "Z!lJiillige Geschichlswahrheilen kiillllen der Bnveis VOn l1ollllvendigl'lI
Verl1lll1ftswahrheiten nil' werden." Lessing, "Ueber Jen Flc:weis des Ceisles und der KrJI't;'

5 [ET: "Onlhe Proof of the Spiril and of Power," 85].
46. "Historische Einzelerkel//llnisse kiinnCll del' Beweis von e,vigen Ceschichtswul'II'lleit<!n
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'!'oshim<lsa '(asubla notes that Lessing uses the terms historische
\Villtrhr:ilt:rl (h istoricalt ruths) and Ceschichtswnhrheiten (truths of history
or historic I ruths) interchangeably, and he argues, similarly to Wobbermin
(bul wi tholl t nH:nl iOll ofWohberl11 in's criticisms of Lessi ng), that Lessi ng's
position would be strengthened by a distinction between the tlVO terms.
I.essing proposeS lh~lt "if no historicdl truth [historische WahrheilJ can
he denHlnstr,lIed, then nothing can be demonstrated by means of his
toricaltrulhs.·1 hat is, accidental truths of history [Gesdlichtswahrheiten]
can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason."·7 Yasukata
Sllggests lh~ll I.essing's argllment lacks conceptual clarity precisely at this
l1oilll.·I.' W\)hhermin sh,Hes this concern, and he reworks Lessing's "ditch"
to distinguish between (;t:Sc!/i(!lte and Historie, thereby attempting to re
direct atlelltion to whM he considers to be the more difficult problem of
t~lilh ,lIll! hist\)ry.
According to WobberI11in, Lessing's ditch suffers from a metaphysi
cal delicil, which is especially ironic given Michalson's conclusion that
this particular slatement concerns precisely the "metaphysical" problem
of rel'lling two diti'erent cldsses of truth. But Wobbermin does not share
N[ichalsoll'S definition \)1' the problem. 111e problem, as Wobbermin sees
it, is Iwt bel ween two clclsses of truth; the problem is the assumption that
there eein be two c1,lsses of truth at all. For Wobbermin, unlike Lessing,
there is only one class of truth: eternal truths of Geschichte. 'n1ere is no
such thing, rherefore, as ",lCcidental" or "contingent" truths. What Lessing
calls acciJenlal truths of history, Wobbermin calls individual historical
cogn it ions. AII trut hs Me truths of Gescllichte because only in and th rough
Cesdlidllt: Gln truth be represented to thinking subjects who themselves
stand within C;t:sehidlte.-Io

Here Wobbermin rarts company with Lessing on the nalure oflruth.
While Lessing wants to define truth in purely rational terms, Wobbermin
prefers to speak of truths operative in andth rough Geschichte. Wobberm i n
hopes to avoid Lessing's rejection of historical demonstrations of truth by
distinguishing between Historie and Geschicllte. Historical research (or, to
use vVobbermin's term here, "individual historical cognirions") will never
provide eternal, historic truths precisely because historical reseclrch yields
results that are always provisional, relative, and probable. But Gescllidllc.:,
being the realm of value and of efficacy, withstands historic11 inquiry .111l!
serves as the vehicle of absolute, eternal truths.
Wobbermin's reasoning is not clear at this point, as he does not l,lke
the further step of defining precisely how eternal truth is present within
and through Geschichte.;ll Only later does he address the role of Scripture
(as divine revelation and the early church's testimony) as lhe vehicle of
eternal truth, but that further step is missing in this early essay.
Wobbermin is content to define eternal truths srecitically as religiuus
truths: "The label 'eternal' should be understood in the s[Jecitic sense of
religious faith - truths belonging to the world of eternity, established in
it, and originating in i1."5 1 Because, according to Wobbermin, "eternal
truths" are sU[Jramundane, they cannot be proved by historical research.
Such truths defy rroofand confront historic subjects only in and through
Geschichte. As such they are accessible only to faith.
To put it in Michalson's terms, here \!\Tobbermin is attelllrting to solve
the problem of religiOUS appropriation, to lear across what Michalson
calls Lessing's "existential ditch." But whereas Lessing turns to the "in
ner self" to discover a truth already present in reason, Wobbennin turns
to Geschichte as the vehicle of eternal truth. Lessing has no need at all
of Historie or Geschichte in any but an i1lustralive caracity; Wobbermin,
on the other hand, bases everything here on a distinction between truth
provided by historical science and religiOUS truth becoming immedialely
present to believers in and through Ceschichte, independent of ,my histor
ical inquiry into past facts, figures, or events. It is enough for Wobbermin

/lie werc/clI." Wobl1l'rlllill, Gi!5clridllC 1I11d Hislorie, 17.
47. l.eosll1g, "Uchc'r dcn Bcwcis Jes CeislCs und der Kraft;' S [ET: "On Ihe Proof of
the Spirit and o( t'"wer," 851.
4.s. Yasuk.!I,1 doc', admil lhal Ihae W,lS nn such Jistinuiun beIwcen G,;schiellie anJ
rlzslorie ill thc lale eigillecnih century_ 13ul he alsu sugge,ts thaI Lessing was aware of a
hISI,)ricIly [(;esdlidillichkeit! lhal cunnnt be approached by historical science, anJ he
a,ks, "Bul i( he kIlUW' this, why, theu, is he so careless in his use of Ihese lerms?" The
answcr, Yasuk.lla suggests, is III be founJ in I.essing's relatiull uf revelation to reason, or
In whal iVlicha\soil calls the "exislcnlial Jitch." Yasukata, Lessing's Philosophy of Religion,
08; lAS, nl\. S7 al1J SIS
49. Wohberlllln, Gesell/chic lind rl/Slorie, 18.
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50. There are inJications, Jiscussed below, ul' such a slep in Wobherl1lin's uilique ol'
Bousser's position, in which 130usset subordinates Gesd/idlle 10 reasun. Wnbhermil1l'rc
l'ers to subordinate reason to Geschichle, which puts him at oJJ, wilh l.cssing as well.

51. "Das Beiwort 'ewig' 501/ also ill/ spezijischell Silllie des religiosell Glul/bells verS{,III
den werden: Wahrheiten, die der Well der EWigkcil lIngehiirerr, ill illr /Ieg,-iindcl Silld, alls
ihr slcml/r/ell:' Wobbermin, Geschichle lIIul Hislorie, 19.
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that llwse elem,lltruths of C;esc!lidlte cannot be proved or disproved by
historical rese,lrch:

under the principle of the Reformers - 'justification through faith by
grace;" and as a scholar with a "profound insight into the problem of the
historical Jesus in the light of the scholarly research inlO the sources";;
Bearing in mind the intention to think systematically under the guidance
of the doctrine of justification through faith by grace, Kahler's primary
concern in these essays on the historical Jesus and the historic, biblical
Christ is to win an "invulnerable area" [sturn/Feit::; GelJidj" for faith,
kicking away the t~llse supports for faith in order to give faith its proper
object: Christ the Lord.
According to Carl Braaten, Kiihler's guest for an invulnerable area tt)r
faith is defined by two interrelated questions: How can the Bible rem,lin
a trustworthy and normative document of revelalion when historic,ll
criticism has shattered confidence in its historical reliability? And second,
how can Jesus Christ be the basis and content of Christian faith whell
historical science can never provide indisputable, certain knowledge of
the historical Jesus?;6
Kahler sets out to answer these questions by means of a l\vo-Il.)ld
argument. First, he attempts to secure Jesus Christ as the basis and con
tent of Christian faith in face of historical doubt by drawing a distinction
between the historical Jesus [der historische Jesus] and the historic Ch rist
[der geschichtlidle Christus]. Second, on the basis of this distinction be
tween the historical Jesus and the historic Christ, he attempts to mainl,lin
confidence in the authority of Scripture by equating this historic Christ
with the biblical Christ rather than with the historical Jesus lying some
where "behind" the texts of the New Testament.
At work behind these arguments is a profound pastoral sensitivity to
the situation of lay Christians, the great mass of those who do not possess
the capacity or the training to engage in complex historical-critical in
vestigations of the New Testament in order to discover the "real" Jesus in
whom they should believe. 57 vVere this erudition necessary for Christian

Lkrl1,d truths of this type, ciS OUI' statement SelYs, cannot be proved
through il1llividu,d historicell cognitions. Because all historical
rcsc'Jr..:h continues in the form of individual historical cognitions,
these clern,d truths c,\I)not be proved through historical research.
i\nd therdme tluths elf this type belong to Ceschiellle; they are
to be ,kscTihed elS truths of Gesellichle. Indeed, in no other way
thelll In Cc.,clliclile und through Ceschic:llie do such truths come to
hUIll,ln b"illgy"!

Wobbcrmin dews not olfer an analysis of Lessing's entire argument
in Oil II'l' Pmolol tile Spirit Oil£! of Power. H,)d he done so, he might have
rl\llized how close his position tlnally is to Lessing's in many important
respects. Ivlost significantly for the purposes of this study, Wobbermin,
perhJps without realizing it, wants to avoid the same dangers as Lessing.
l.essing's primMy cOllcern is to make the religiolls message available to
modern men and women without requiring them first to make an in
\elleClu,11 sacrihce by belieVing secondary historical accounts of dubious
eVc:llts occurring ill the distant past. This is Wobbermin's concern as well.
l11e ditferences between their positions finally appear in their respective
solutions to the prohlem of religiOUS appropriation rather than in their
identilicJlion of the l)rohlel11 itseiLoJ

jly[artin Kahler
Paul Tillich, one of Kiihler's last surviving students, rdlected on Kahler's
theologiC<11 legacy ill his foreword to the English translation of Kahler's
Tilt: So-colle,l UistoriCllI Jesus and the Historic Biblical Christ. Tillich re
memhers Kiihler as a "strictly systematic thinker who developed his ideas
52..' ElVi~c' W"JrrJreitm clieser Art, sagt dU111l <llsu uliser Sa/z, kOliliell d(creh histo
risthe J-:'illzdakellllillisse lIidlt /JelViesCII werdell. Sie kOllIlell folglich, 01,1 cllle his/orische
ForSc!llllcg ill der Forlll hislurischer E"lzderkelllllllis verlJlljr, iiberhaupt nichl dr/reh
I,is(oris(he forsdllcllg /JeIVicsell ll'erderL lI",/ cluch gehorell vVahrheilen dieser Art der
Cesdll,hte Oil: "Is C;eschichISIV"hrheileJl sind sie w beuichJleJl. Ja gar nichl anclers als
ill ,kr C;es, hid/le Wid aLlS der Geschichle kOll/II1eJl so/che WahrheiteJl 'lil den Menschen
iIawL'· Ihid, 1~-1().
53 l'c:rh'lps the later 'Hohberll1in would have found even more support in Lessing's
proposells, specifically as 'Hohher-min devdoj.Jed the rdigin'j.Jsycl10logical circle j.Jrecisely
(yc'l LlIlconsciously wilh regard I,) Lessing) to hridge all three of Lessing's ditches, the
··tcmpor,JI·LI..:ILlal:' the "metaphysical," and the "existentiaL"
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54. Tillich, forewnrd to The Su-wlled Historical Jesl/5 cmd tile His/uric Bi/Jlic,,! Clilis/,
by Marlin Kahler, vii.
55. This catchword, "invulnerable area:' has become synonymous with K<ihkl.'s en
tire theological j.Jroject, eSj.Jecially in terms of the problem of faith and history. Sec, e.g,
13rachmann, whose chapter on Kahler is entitled ·'Das 'Slurmfreie' Gc'biet des (;laubens
bei Martin Kahler." Brachmann, GIL/live Wid Geschichte, 22-26.
56. Braaten, introduction to The So-called Hislorical

JeSIlS,

lO

57. This j.Jaslllral sensitivity is onen more torrnully expres,ed in the desire for cerlain
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f'lith, Kahler nOles, there would have been no true Christians for almosl
seventeen cenluries, and there would be very few true Christians even in
his own day:

rnan 63 In other words, in reacting against the perceived DoceliSIll of ,1n
abstract dogmatism, the Life ofJesus movement falls prey to a subtle (or,
in some cases, not so subtle) Ebionitism.
The fatal flaw of the Life of Jesus movement, according to K~lhler, is
its failure to recognize the unique character of the biblical texts. '[he mod
ern biographers of Jesus approach the gospels as historical documents
of an equal value as all other historical docu£llents alld expecl to find
objective, unbiased sources for reconstructing the personality and life of
Jesus of Nazareth. Kahler rejects this presupposition and argues IhM 110
such objective, unbiased sources are available in the New Testament, and
that there are therefore no sources in the New Testament adequale to the
task of constructing a reliable historical biography of Jesus. Or as K~ihler
puts it:

III (.-:111 isl i,1I1S I ivi JIg before t he ad vent of h isrorical-crit ical schohH
shipJ cOlllt'J1If,!ated ,llld I-vorshipped the jesus of the Gospels in just
Ihis obsllllily \·vhich [hist<)riansj profess to rind in these texts and
tecl bound to I'emove, then indeed they would not have known
their Savior. And so it wnukl be fnr all Christians after them, right
u fl 10

liS. :'h

'I he situdlion is nut as dire as this, of course, as Kahler insists that
lhe }c:sus of lhe historians is not the "real Christ" at all, but a figment of
the historiallS' inlaginations-"J The entire Life offesus movement,"') Kahler
u)Illellds, "collLe,lis from us the liVing Christ."'" It is a real and present
danger to the faith of Christians and must be rejected. It is, Kiihler argues,
a "hlilld ,liley."o! l~ut d blind alley very often appears to be the correct
roule; otherwise nu ,llle would travel it at all. There is something legiti
male abnul the "quest (or the historical fesus:' dnd Kahler finds its legiti
111,1Cy ill the critique o(an abstract dogmatism that threatens to conceal or
obliteJ'ale the humanity of Jesus. The quest becomes illegitimate as soon
as it falls into the error of regarding Jesus as nothing more than a mere
Iy I Ce)l'i!i!te;11 thOlI permcalcs Kjhkr's work. For nn analysis of the problem of certainty
il) r;,1I1kr's work, SeC Mcnckc, Erjilflrllng wltl Gn"ip!tcit des C/(/lIbcns.
5x.

~jhkr,

Dcr sogcl/(/l/l/!e 1,;s!ori;c!Je jesL/s, 61 rET The So-wiled Historiw/ /estIS,

nil
59 Il);d, 5511:1', 551
hC'l' Olllcmpis dt ,) hisloricdl hiography or ksus Me chronicled ill Schweitzer's
(;,'st!lidlle tic! l.elJcl/,!<:slt·Forsc!lIltlg [1::T: 'I hL Quest of the Historical JesusJ. The Quest
for the Hi,loricdl Jesus l'eell1Lrged in the middle oflhe I;vcnlieth century inlhe so-called
"Second l,)ue,t" induguraled hy Lrnst Kiisemann and others. See Robinson, A New Quest
of I/IC flii(uriC,11 /c,w, dnd Harwy and Ogden, ""Vie neu ist die 'Neue Frage nach dem
hi'lurischen JesuS'I" [ET: "How Ncw is Ihe 'New Quesl f,)r lhe Historical Jesus'?"].
60. '1

fll

K:ihkr, Dcr sugCI/(IIII1!C It;storiid,e j"s//s, 44 [ET: The So-calleJ Historical /es//s,

ell I

62 Ihid,.p [LT, 46). 'I he term Kahler uses here is "Holzweg:' which is lilernlly a
"logging road" or "Ioggc'r's path," ,1 rough path in the rore:>! lhat is difticulllO travel and
oflcn simply cnds, Icadillg nowhere. In CLtman it can refer 10 anything that leads to
C'Hlfusioll llr to Jnylhing that is misleading. It can he expressed in J variety of English
idioms, including "barking up the wrong tree," "being on Ihe wrong track," or "leading
Sllineonc up the garden palh." Hraatcn translales it as "hlind alley," which is a meaning
c1o,;cr III the origindl, litLtdlmeaning of Ihe Cerman.
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We have no sources for a "Life of Jesus" thai J historian can ac·
cept as authentic and sufficient, J stress: for a biography of Jesus o(
NazMeth according to the currently accepted standards of his tori
cal scholarship. A credible picture of the Savior for believers is a
completely different thing6~

It is the method of historical research itself that leads Kahler to this
conclusion. The gospels exist in almost total isolation, so that nothing
else is known of Jesus of Nazareth except what is contained in them. 111e
gospels cannot with any certainty be traced to eyewitnesses. The gospels
themselves only tell us about select periods of Jesus' life. Finally, even
within the New Testament itself there are two radically different types of
gospels (synoptic and Johannine), and these often contradict one another
(to say nothing of the contradictions within the synoptic tradition itself)."s
Any hope of producing a comprehensive and accurate historical biogra
phy of Jesus of Nazareth from these sources alone is a slim hope indeed.
What one finds, instead, is a "vast expanse of the ruins [Triill/merjddj of
i nd ivid ual trad itions:'66
Alongside the problem of adequate sources, another problem faces
historians who wish to compose a reliable, accurate biography of fesus
of Nazareth. One of the hallmarks of the historical method is the use of
63. Ibid, 47-48 [ET, 46-471.
64. Ibid., 49 [ET, 481
65

Ibid. [ET, 48-49]

66. Ibid., 49-50

lET, 491.
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the llrinciple of an,l!ogy. 'rhe historian must find all analogy in current
human evenls or experience in order to explain what is difficult or ob
sUIre in the past, and here the biographical task breaks down. Faced with
so many gaps in the supposedly historical record of the life of jesus, the
Illolkrll hislori,1I1 is fl)rced to find an analogy in his own life or in human
Iile in gelleral, so thai "it is mostly jesus being refracted through the spirit
of Ihese gentlemen lhemselves."6i What is typically produced is a jesus in
the inlage of the hisllllian, the Jesus he has hoped to lind from the outset
of his research. 'Ihis )csus, then, is supposed to be the object of Christian
,",lith. Bra,lten suggests Ihal Ihis use of the historical-critical method to
secure the object or faith is finally J subtle form of works righteousness:

This Jesus is not the historical jesus of modern biography, but the hisloric
Christ, the revelation of God.
Historical science, no matter how faithfully and thoroughly elll
ployed, cannot provide this historic Christ for faith. The historic Christ,
the Christ of the Bible, COIlles to people not through the "midwifery
[Hebanll1lenkiinste] of historical research,"71 but through the preaching of
the church. The real Christ is the Christ who is preached, and this Christ
is the Christ offaith?!

111 krills of lhe rd;)I"\11atioll !;ic) JOdrille of Justification by grace
aloJll', through t'lith ,.IIOIIC, ill the Word U/OIIC, the actuality of
salv'llion is not dq)enc!cllt L1pon the preparatory works of man,
whether 111(ll"al, religiOUS, or intellectual, whether philosophical or
historical."o

'Ihere IS a further Ilaw inherent in the application of the principle
of analogy to the biblictl sources concerning jesus. According to Kahler,
modern historians (whether they are conscious of it or not) are looking
for a jesus who resembles them, their 1110ral and religious sensibilities,
and their Lei/geist. This bias requires them to search for a jesus who is
fundamentally like all other hUl11an beings. While jesus is like all other
human beings by virtue of the humanity he shares with them, he is, more
importantly, utterly unique in hUll1an history: he is the silliess Son of God,
unlike all other hLlll1an beings in kind and not only in degree 69 TIlOse
who seek jesus in order to see the Father through him (John 14:9) do not
seek him because he is like them, but because he is radically unlike them.
Or as K~ihler puts it, "I am not seeking someone like myself, but rather
my counterpart [Cegenstiick], my completion [Ergiinwtlg], my Savior."io

07. [hId, 57 [LT, 571. Kihler's crilicism of (he use or the principle of analogy in
historicrl-critical analysis of the New Test,lInent is quite simrlar to the posilion later
takcn hy Wollharl I'anncnhag. See Panncnberg, "Herlsgeschehw unJ Geschichte" [ET:
"1~edcmpLive Lvcnl and 11 ISIO\")''' I.
68. IlraalclI, "Christ, raith, and History:' 47. Emphasis in original.
0'). Kihler, Va sogellwllile Izis(orisdle !esus, 53 [ET: TIle So-called Historical Jesus,

531

Here the distinction between the historical [historisch] and the his
toric [geschichtlich 1 is cruciaL For Kahler, the historical Jesus is jesus as
he is known by historical research. The historic Christ, huwever, is the
earthly Jesus in his significance, as he is the ohject of faith.'\ Kiihler is so
unwilling to "go behind" the texts of the New Testament thai he is unwill
ing to make allY distinction at all between the historic and the biblical
Christ; the historic Christ is the Christ of the Bible?' This Christ is the
Christ of apostolic preaChing, the Christ who awakened failh in the dis
Ciples alld who is therefore confessed as Lord. He is, according to l\jhler,
the originator of the biblical picture of Christ, the basis and the conlent
of faith.
The identification of the historic Christ with the biblical Christ raises
serious difficulties for Kahler's position. Most importantly, Kahler seems
ultimately to be unWilling to grant historical criticism any Significant role,
even though he repeatedly denies this charge.75lfthe historic Christ is the
Christ of the whole Bible, then it is difficult to determine how and where
historical criticism might gain a foothold for its work. New Testament
scholar Georg Strecker makes a similar observation in an essay on the
historical and theological problem of the "Jesus question":
7l. IbiJ., 18 [ET. 1211.

n

Ibid., 66 [ET. 66]

73. Given the imporlance of this dislinction for his argulllenl, it is sllrprising th'lt
Kihler nowhere offers a clear Jetlnition of these lerms beyond their immediate rckv'lIlcc
to the topic at hanJ. It is especially interesting to nOll', too, lhat K;ihler rard)' Jistln
gUishes between Ihe nominal forms Hisrorie anJ Geschichre. ., he Jislinction <'Xi,ts (0\"
him almosl soldy in the aJjeclival forms historiidl anJ gesdlichtlidl, anJ unly with rckr
ence to jesus Christ.
74. lbiJ, 86 [ET, 86J.
75. Kahler claims to have accepleJ historical inquiry int<) the New "["cstamcnt texts

"for cerlain purposes:' anJ accuses Ihose who Jeny that he has any positive use
torical criticism to have misunJerstooJ him. IbiJ., 20 lET, 124].

70. Ibid., 5') 11'.1', 5')1.
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An 1I1K ri ticJ I 'Hloptioll of I(jhl cr's position s hould

be impos-

sible Silh':C IllS ,1llc'lllpt to li bera te theol ogy fro m th e probability
jud g m c ilt s ()I th e hi s tur ica l-c ritical meth o d did not face LIp to th e
lju es tioll o( the theol'lgic al right, all d the theological n ecessi ty of
hi , tori c,ll c ritici snl.
As a lit er,lry entity, th e biblical witlless
01 - th e hi , to ri" C hrist c<1 un ol be exc lud ed from furth er hi sto ri,-a l-c rlticd illljlllry Ahove a ll. howeve r, a deci sio n to ignore the
hist or ic,li -u itic,ll framing of the qu es tion would be, th eo lo gica ll y,
f)lOblen1.11i ,:,lI f;lilure _ It would not take into account the und er-

,I
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tori c Christ because the suprahist o ric Christ transce nd s histor y and is no t
limited to the chilin ofcause and effect determinative of tlorIllal hisI Oric.t1
development. Christ's "histo ric- suprahi storic efFect " is present ,Ind el-Yecti ve within the church, in it s confession of t~lith, and in the li ving {~lith or
Christians themsel ves. 79 In other words, the suprahistoric Chr ist is only
present to faith and therefore cannot be provided by hist o rical research.·'lI
Braaten also no tes the imposs ibility of direct histo rica l knowledge 01' the
su prah isto rie:

stalllllllg ul ' l-calit y whi c h und e rlie s the hi s to rical-criti ca l method ,
nu l' th e sc l( und e rs ta nding of th e m o d e rn wor ld ge ne r,dl y_76

Neverthel ess, K;ihler is Illore co nce rned to il lio w the hi sto ric, bibl ica l
C hri st tll co nfront re,)ders and hearers o f Scripture direct ly than he is to
m,) il)l<1in <l ny ind epend ence o r va lidil y fo r hi sto ri ca l criti cism.
'1he hislori ca l Jesus is of no interest to faith; thi s mu ch Kahler makes
dhso lutely c ieJL ' 1he hi sto ri c Chri st, th e Chri st o r th e Bible, is th e object of
C hri slidn Llith, dva ilahl e tll eve ry person in every time and pla ce thro ugh
the church's pmchlilldtion of Chri st ,1S Lord. But there is iI third category
o perati ve in K~ihl e r's lrea tillent , nalllel y, the suprahi sto ri c [iibergeschichIliclt] "0' 'I he sLiprah ist o ric, acc ording to Kahl er, de signates th il t which
wo uld nol ex ist ,)part tro m hi sto ry but w hose signili cance is not ex hau st ed within th e confines o f th e histor ical nexus . Tn the suprahistoric, then,
"w hat is uni ve rsa lly va lid is Joi ned to th e hi stor ic to beco me an efFective
presen ce [Wirksilll/-G ege llwartigellj ."7B 'The suprahisto ric C hrist is Christ
in hi s imm ediat e signifi ca nce and presen ce for hum anit y, wh o is always
re ld ted to the hist o ri c C hrist but never limited to hi s hi stor icity. Kahler
co nt end s that hi Slo rical research is incap able o f prod ucing this supra his70.

Slrcck cr, ''' I hc Hislorl C,t1 dnJ '1heol og ical Problem of th e jesus Queslion:' 20 2.

77_ Ilradlcll tr~ll s l,llc S '\ihc rgesc hi chlli ch" as "s uprah isto rica l" ratha than "s uprahi sIOrlC," which r~li l s 10 cl,nvcy Ihe mea ning K(i hler interl(kd. Th e su prahislori c, for Kii hl er,
is rel ,ll cd to Ih e hi sto ric and lIot to th e hi sto rical at all. To Irans late "iibcrgesch ic htl ich" as
'\ uprahiSlll n cal " simpl y add s ullllece,sdfY cO llfusio n to the issu e.
71l. Ka hler, Ocr soge llwJIl/e historische /eslls, 48, n. 1 I ET: The So -called Hi storical
JeS IIS, ~ 7, 11. 21. ['llr morc Oil Ihe sup rah isto ri c in Kiihler, sec Hagg lunJ , "Martin Kiihl ers
leo n Olll del (l\'cr hiSi onska i kr istcnJomcn" anJ l.eipold, 0Jfimbamllg Wid G<!schichte als
Problem des Vcrs/ehells, cspeci all y C hapler -I, "Der Begriff Jes Obergcsc hichrli chell." Fo r
,I slighll y dlflCre ll! apl'l'<)dch Ih 'lIl Kahler's, see Di bdiu s, Geschichtlidle W Id iibergeschichtl,d,e Relig ioll dnJ BlIllin an n', revit:" ', "G.: sc hi chtl ic hc und ub ergeschich tli che Religion"
II:T "Hisl,)ri(dl a llJ Supra-hi sl ori ca l Reli gion ill C hristi anity"\, the English translati o n
01' whi ch ~I ,o aJds to Ih e co nfu sio n b), tran shlting gesdlichtlich as "hi storica l."

Fa ith which li ves on ly ill histor y can be reLlt t' d to the slIpr,lhi s torical re velatiollal reality because this rea lit y has ent e red int o hi stor y
and is now knolv able excl USively thro ugh hi s tory. . _. C e ntl;li sc ience can d ea l with the s uprahi s tori ca l onl y indi rec t ly, n;llll e ly, b y
ana lyzing the words and s tatements that have beell translllltted in
the docum e nts of redemptive hi stor y, a n d by taking dClOlillt o f th e
hi stor ical e ffec ts of these s tat eme nts in histol')'."'

Despite the wide-ranging implicati o ns of a further distinction between the histori c and the suprahistoric, Kahler dOes not explo re those
impli ca ti ons in hi s essays on the distinction between the histori ca l Jes Lls
an d the histo ric Christ. Had he done so, he might have avoided o r at least
more success full y defend ed his position aga in st the charge of failure to
grant histori ca l criticism access to the biblical picture of Jesus Christ. He
clea rl y moves in this direction by defining th e bibli cal te xts variously dS
se rmons, confessions, or testimonies rather than mere hi sto ri ca l do cuments, as such ultimately remaining unafFected by histori ca l in quiry, but
his fililure to make a stricter distin ction betwee n the hi stor ic C hrist of
the Bible and the suprahistoric Christ as the immedi ately present and effi cac ious Lord keeps his positi o n open to ch<lrges of biblicism, however
unfair th ose charges ultimately may be.
79. Kahler, Del' sogellamlle hisforische JeSIIS, 94

I FT: The So-wllcd flis /oricill

leS/I .' ,

95 1·
80. 111is is so, Leip olJ suggests, because fo r Kahl er th e supr a hi stori c ori ginaks ill
and is available through re vel ation al on e. Chri st, in his signilicallce for failh (i.c, as i1w
revelati on of God in history) , represents th e act ual ( Oil lent of the cOllcq)1 o f Ih e s upra hi storic. It is utt erl y unique as Chris! is ult erl ), uniqu e, and ils usc, espcclally in K:ih kr 's
J og mati cs, is limiteJ 10 description s of th e wnlen! of sa lvalioll , th e recollcili,lIion of
th e wo rlJ 10 God and the jll stitication of sinn ers. Leif-lold, OJ/en/z"nlllg 1I11l1 Ge;cilichfe,
98- 107. Kahkr refers rea Jers 10 his dogma tics for III ore o n the co ncept of the sllpr<lhi stori c. See Kahler, Die Wissen schajt da christlichen Lehre, ~ 13, 13- 15. Kahle r give, !he
saille J di llit ion th ere as he J oes above.

8 1. Braa ten , "Chri st, Faith , alld History," 89 -90.
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As it sta nd s, Ka hl er is co nt ent to eq uate the hi sto ri c Chri st with
th e bihl ic,l l piL"l ure o( hi m ,1nd to loca te th e efficacy and the prese nce of
Christ in th e church's proc lama tio n of him as its Lo rd . By removin g th e
bibli cal pict u re nf th e hi storic C h rist fro m the rea lm of crit ica l histor ical
ill ves tig clt in l1 , and by lay in g bare the reve lat.o r), charac ter of thi s pi cture
,1III I it s c() llli llllin g pres e nce in th e proc lamati o n of the chu rch, Ka hl er
ho pes I U hi1ve sec ured il n invulnerah le area fo r faith in C hrist.
But 11 ,lS he succ.:ed ed in establ is hin g and pro tectin g thi s in vuln e rahle arL',l (or fil ilh ? b h is pns itinn fi nall y imp er vio us to <l thoroughgo in g
hi st<)ri c,li c riti cis m n i" th e so urces? Wilhel ill Brac hll1 a nn , fo r exa mple,
co ncludes th at !:-:.;ihl er wa s un successrul in his atte mpt to es tablish thi s
in vuln eril bl e Me a 11l"<lC hlll <l lln suggests th at the weak ness oflGi hle r's po siti l) n is his reii ,111 ce o n th e Easte r exper ience of th e disc iple s as the o ri gin
of tes t im nny ahuut th e ri sen C hri st, an ex perien ce th at Kahler sugges ts is
ti ldly ol' a sup rahis tol'ic rea li ty. Des pite K ~i hler 's in sistence th at thi s eve nt
is Slll)ra hi stur ic r,lth e r th an hi stor ic, the ex peri ence itself neve rtheless
oc clirs within history. Acc ord ing to Brac hm ann , th en, one mu st recko n
with th e possihility th at a hi stor icc1 1 ex pl anat ion wi ll be fo und fo r what
Kii hl er insis ts is a suprahi sto ric reality. O r as Brachma nn puts it , "a mortal
dan ger threa tens K~ihl e r's thesis of an in vulne rabl e area fo r fa ith fr om the
sid e h istll ry."Xl
Pe rh aps [,;ihl e r's sho rtcom in gs ca n be attribut ed, at least in pa rt , to
two relat ed ch,lrac teris ti c feat ures of hi s th eo lo gica l wo rk: hi s sllspi cion
of hi sto rica l cr iti cism .1S it is ap plied to th eo log ica l wo rk and hi s Hirtatio n with an un criti cd l bibli cism. Hi s suspic io n of h is to ri ca l criti cism and
its ro le in Ih eo log icd l wo rk hinders its imp ortant nega ti ve fun c ti o n in a
the olog ical <lnc1 lysis of th e New Tes tamen t. Kahle r fears stum bli ng o nto
a slipl)e ry slo pe if hi stor ica l criti cism is permitted free and unres trained
access to th e bibli C<l l tr<ld it io n, and he co nstructs his in vulne rabl e area fo r
faith in o rd er to pro tec t bo th faith and th e Bibl e fro m all Y unnecessa ry
incurs io ns by hi stor ica l cr iticismS}

ur

~2 ,

Ilmc h lll .1I1n , GJ..lldN

Wil l

GeScilichk, 21\.

tU , IIraa te n a d dr~ s$cs Ka h k r's alti tud e towarJ hi stor ica l u il icis m in th e int roJu c lio n
tll hi s tnllb la tion el f pa ri or Kahkr's Der stJge/ll./rIrI/e historische /esl/S, b ut he Joes no l
reach Ih e saillc co nclusi()n reg'lrdi ng K,ihkr's suspicio ns of unrL's trkteJ histor ical cri ti cis lll , Scc IIrda tc n , " lnt ro du c l i()Il ," 26 1f.
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Wobb ermin's Apprai sa l and C ritiqu e of Kahl e r's Pos iti on
Wobb ermin's pos itio n wo uld appear to he quite close to Kii hler's, espeCiall y in term s of the imp o rta nce of a d isti ncti on betwee n Gescit icittl!. ,1I1d
Historie. Wobbermin praises Kahler for so effecti vel ), expos in g the "blind
all ey" of the Life of Jesus movem ent , both in ter ms of the lilllit s o( hi sto ri cal knowledge in gen eral and of hi sto ri cal inquir y into the gospe ls in
parti c ulM. Wo bbermin agrees that the entire Life of Jes us movem ent is ,1
blind all ey, insofar as it attempts to prov ide dn e ndurin g foundati on for
C hristi an faith in th e res ults of its resea rch s <
On th e surface, eve n Ka hl er's and Wohbennin's di stin ct io ns het wee ll
Gei chichte and Historie appear to be identi cal. For both ,- the hi stll ri c,d
Jes us is th e Jes us of modern hi sto ri ca l biograph )', the produ ct of hi storic11
investi ga ti on of the bibli ca l tex ts. The hi sto ri c Chr is t, 0 11 the o ther ha nd ,
is the Savior who co n fron ts readers and hearers of th e New Tesl,lI11 ellt d irec tly, witho ut what Kiihl er ca lled "th e mid wi fer y of historica l rese'l rch."
To ba se fa ith on a product of hist o ri cal sc holarship is to require d blse
fo undation fo r faith , to make faith depend ent on th e relat ive and proba bl e
res ult s of histo ri ca l sc holarship and o n th e auth or it y of hi sto ri alls rath e r
th an the li vin g C hri st.
Wobbe rmin parts co mpa ny with Ka hl er, howe ve r, O il the defini tio n
of the hi stor ic C hrist. Ka hl e r in sists th at th ere is no distin cti o n at ,111 between th e hi sto ri c Christ and the C hri st of the Bi ble ; he is cia gl!.Scllichtfiche, bibfische Christus. Wo bbe rmin is unwillin g to eq u<lte the hi stor ic
Christ with the bi bli ca l Chri st, in stead in sistin g th at th e hi stori c C hri st
is a narrower fi g ure than the bibli ca l pi cture of him . Woh be rmin does
no t obj ec t to the fac t "' th at' Ka hler id entifi es the hi stor ic with the bibli ca l
Chri st, but to ' how' he does thi s."s5 Th e hi sto ri c Christ is th e bibli ca l Chr ist
fo r Wo hber min as well as fo r Kah ler. But th e bibli ca l Christ, Wobberill in
argues, ca nn ot simply be equated wi th the hi sto ri c C hri st as if th ere we re
no distinc tio n betwee n th e two.
A th o ro ughgoing hi sto ri ca l criti cism will cl arify th e pic ture of th e
hi sto ric, biblica l C hrist so th at onl y those eleme nts th at are "trul y" his toric will rema in . Kahler, Wobbermin argues, wa s un able or un willin g to
ca rr y hi s di stin ctio n betwee n Geschichte and Historie to its log ical cO ll cl u84. Wo b b~ rl11il1 , Ge:;ch ichte ulld His loric, 2 1.

85. "Nicht 'daft' Kah ler, sOlldo rtl 'die Art, Ivie' er dell ge:;chidli liche ll
Chr islil s iden fijiziert, beallstallde ich." Ib iJ .. 22.
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sion, ""hich, at least in Wobhermin's estimation, would require a further
distinction hetween lhe biblical Christ illld the historic Christ. In other
w()Ids, it is Iwl K:ihler's dehnition of CesciJichte, but rather his limitation
ol'histnrical inquiry inlO the biblical texts (and by extension his dehnition
nl' /-lislorie) thai cOllStitules his failure to carry his own distinction to a
fru itl'ul end;"
f\ccording to Wohhermin, free and unrestrained historical investi
gation o(the hihlical picture of Christ would make any wholesale identifi
C<llion (ll' this picture wilh the hisloric Christ impossible. Whereas Kahler
conclud<:s that the two Ulnnot be distinguished in any meaningful way,
Wohbermin conLends that historicdl research finally limits the historic
Christ to three essential elements: his ethical disposition toward love, his
Uility or will Illith his heavenly Father, and his elevation to the Father fol
lOWing Iris surl'ning and deatlr,s7 'I hese three clements alone constitute
the essent ia I pictu re of tile histnric Christ lhat con fronts Ch ristidns ill the
New Testament.
'I he decisive questil)n here is a question of method: how hdve these
three elcillents of the New Testament picture of Christ been isolated and
presented as tire essential picture of the historic Christ? Wobbermin in
tends to isolate these three elements by applYing his distinction between
Geschich!£: and j-lislorie to tire texts of the New Testament. By applying
lhis dislinctioll to the biblical picture of Christ, Wobbermin intends to
separate every e1emenl of that picture that is merely historical [hislorischj
frolll those elements that are considered historically [geschichllich] active
dnd dhcacious [wirksallli in the Christian tradition and into the present.
<Jnly these aclive and efficilcious elements are to be considered decisive
for the hisloric picture of Ch rist. They are not considered decisive on the
basis of historicli judgment alone, because this would fail to free faith
from a dependence on the judgments of historians. They are consid
ered decisive hecause these three elements confront readers of the New
Testament directly anJ because they continue to represent the decisive
picture of Christ throughout the history of the Christian tradition and
into the present.
oc>. IhiJ., 20-21.
~7. "".:ill~ ftJlljc/J~ Li~b~;g~;illllllllg ill ihrer R~illh~ic 1Ilid Kraft, ;~itl~ Wi/J~n;eillh~il
lIlit dem 1llllllllli;clJerI Vuter ulid - mit die;er lelzlererI LIlifs g~l1all~ste zusamlll~lllziirIgelid
- ;t:i'lc' ErhdlJJllg :lIm Vuler l/LlLh erlilterIc'ItJ Kreuze;tod~: dLl; ;illJ die lvlvlIlerIle, die im
let:tc'1l Gnllldt: da; BIIJ ,It's ge;,;h;t:htlic/lell ChristllS '/l/;machell." IbiJ., 23.

44

Geschichte

~lnd

Historie

The isolation of these three essential elements of the picture of Jesus
Christ places Wobbermin on rather shaky ground in strictly hislMical
terms. He fails to account for the limited historical perspective l)( the
reader of the New Testament and appears to affirm the possibility of ",h,ll
Rudolf Bultmann would later call a "presuppositionless exegeSis" (or
what might also be called "purely objective exegesis").'<~ 'I his limitdlilln
of perspective - or, to put it another way, the li'ependence on the reader's
Own historical, philosophical, and cultmal context - is especi,llly clear
in terms of \Nobbermin's first essential element. In emphasizing jesus'
ethical disposition tOI·vard love, Wobbermin is dependent on lhe moral
and ethical emphaSis of nineteenth-century liberal Proteslalltism, which
was later critiqued by Karl Barth and others as being rooted ill bourgeois
sentiments or a so-called Kulturprotestl.lI1lislI/us rather than a purely his
torical reading of the "strange world" of the New Testament.
But the selection of these three "essenlial elements" also rdiscs the
question of both the freedom of historical-critical inquiry and the Ir,lns
parency of its use. vVobbermin consistently affirms his openness to a free
and unrestrained historical investigation of the New Testament, both in
order to strip away any false supports tor faith and to allow the truly ef
ficacious historic elements to remain, independent o( historical research.
Here Wobhermin's method breaks down, precisely because he insists hoilt
that he has granted historical criticism free and unrestrained ,Kcess to
the bihlical picture of Christ and that these three essential elements of tire
biblical picture of Christ remain unaffected hy historical criticism. These
three elements, he suggests, are historic because they have remained ac
tive and efficacious throughout the history of the Christian tradition WJ
To his credit, he does brietly engage in a historical-critical investigation
of some pertinent texts to illustrate and support his c1aim."tl BUl he does
not account for the pOSSibility that continued historical investigation of
the New Testament might one day cast doubt on the historical reli'lhility
88. S~~ Builinann, "1st voraussetzungslos~ Ex~g~se Illi\glich?" [ET: "Is Ext:ge~is With
out Presuppositions Possible?"j. As Buhmann wlllllJ argue a tt:w Jecades laler, presup
position less ~xegesis is impossible becaUSe tbe ex~get~ is always also a hi~toric ~lIbject
who stands within the history being investigated and coJlIinu~s to be inlillen,;eJ by it.
The goal in that cas~ is IlOt to prelenJ one is capable or rr~eing ()nesdr rrllm any "nd all
presupposilions, but to acknowledge the'se presupp'lsiti()ns anJ to Jo one's exegetic,1
work wilh lh~Il1 constantly in mind.
89. This claim on its own is rather Jil'licult to suppllrt in stricti)' hi,tnricalterllls.
90. Wobbermin, Geschichce

1ll1d

Historic', 24-25.
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of one or 1ll00e of these three essential elements of the historic picture of

remains in the past. His position remains open to critique on purely his

Chrisl, ,1 possibililY that is inherent in the nature of historical investiga

torical grounds, however, which in this case might be inevit,lble given the

tion ilself. Wobbermin is conhdent that these three dements will remain

nature of the matter itself, namely, basing the historic effects of Christ in

un'ltfected hy historical investigation, but in this case such confidence is

some sense on a figure of history, Jesus of Nazareth.

aln10si certainly unw<lITanted.
rLll'lhermOle, it is ironic th<1t 'vVobbermin insists that these three ele
ments are unalfected hy historical criticism while also suggesting that they

Wilhelm Herrrm1l1n

are provided by historical investigation."1 Here Wobbermin fails to abide

Herrmann did not make a consistent distinction between Geschichle '1I1d
Historie, yet his work is permeated with the question of faith and histori

by his own requiremellt that the historic picture of Christ not be provided
by historicd rese,lrch Also, it might be true that these three essential ele

cal knowledge. 93 Like Kahler and Wobhermin, Herrl1ldnn operdte~ with

ments oj' the bihlic'll picture of the historic Christ have remained active
and eiliclcious throughout the history of Christianity, but it might also be
true llut they will ce<lse to be so at some point in the future, and that new

a strong suspicion of the ability of historical research to provide certdinly
for faith:
The decision reached [by historical criticism] nukes a cLlim at the
outset to nothing more than prObability. Vve are always prep,lred
for the possibility that our results can be modified by a more pre
cise consideration or through the discovery of new accounts. It is
obvious that such a decision cannot provide LIS wilh facts on which
religious faith could be based.'!·

"essenti<ll elements" will emerge on the basis of the continuing develop
ment of the church ,IS a historic institution and its continui~ use and
proclamation of Scripture. lhis alone is not sufficient reason to abandon
these elements, but it is perhdps grounds for a more restrained confidence
In their perm,lnent 'lnd enduring value alld their imperviousness to free
hisloricallnL]uiry.
Wobbermin insists that what is historic is ultimately what is active
and etticlCious ill history, beyond mere historicity. The key to this insis
tence is the concept of etticacy or elfect [Wirksamkeit or Wirkul1g]. What
is histOlical is of interest primarily to historians and is the product of their
research, while what is historic is eflicacious beyond its mere historic
ity dnd continues to affect and inHuence the present from the past. 91 In
this Clse, his selection of these three essential elements can be justified.

Historical judgments are always judgments of prObability, and even
the highest possible probability is insufficient as d foundation tl)r faith.
He asks, "What kind of a religion would that be which would want to
accept the basis for its conviction with the consciousness that it WdS Oldy
probably safe?"95 According to Herrmann, then, the vdlue of historical
research in the theological task is its shattering of false supports for faith
and its continuing comparison of faith's picture of Jesus Christ with the
results of historical investigation of the New Testament:

Wobberlllin moves beyond Kahler by attempting to distingUish between
the hiblical Christ and the histOriC Christ both by means of historical in
vestigation of the New Testament and by means of a preference tor the
hist,)ric over the historical, the presently efficacious rwirksanr] over what
91 IhiJ,2·-1.
92. '1 his Jetillilioll of Ihe etfect or dhcacy of the historic is remarkahly similar to
Kihler's oCC,,,iOIl,li use of Ihe term "iibergeschichllich." II is quite curious, then, that
Wohbermill never menlions "<ihkr's use of this tcrm. In his stuJy of faith anJ his
tory, Wilhelm IlrJChnlanl1 elltitks hiS chapter on Wobbcrmin "Dk ubergeschichtliche
Wahrheil," eVt'll Ihough Wohhermin himself never, to my knowleJge, actually uses Ihis
term. llut there ,Ire clear similarllies between Wohberl11ill's unJerSianJing of the ellects
of hhtory, or the t'ilicacy of the historic picture of Christ, and Kahler's infrequent Lise of
the term ''suprahistoric." See Brachl11ann, Glclllbe IIl1d Geschichre, 57-61.
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Historical work on the New Testament is not without value for
faith. In the first place, it shows us how little the New Testament
texts provide for a historical account undertaking to set forth, as
a result of scientific evidence, what the person of !eSLIS means for
the Christian. As earnest historical work on the New Test,lment
93. See, e.g_, Herrmann, "Der geschichtliche Christus der Crund unseres C\allhens";
"Soli es eine besonJere theologische Geschichtsforschung geben ?"; "Warlll11 hedarf lInSLr
Glaube geschiLhtlicher TatsJchen l "; and "Grund lInJ lnhalt Jc:s GlallIKllS.·' For Ill()re on
Herrmann's Christulugy, see Sock.ness, "The IJeal anJ the Historic,I! ill the Christol<>gy
of Wilhelm Herrmann" anJ Greive, Der Grulld des Glallbells.
94. Herrmann, Del' Verkehr des Chris/ell mit Golt, 57 [ET: The COllllllllrlioll 0/ the

Christian with God, 69].
9S

IbiJ, 59

[ET, 72]
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dt:~lruys such

cLlims, it shatters talse supports for faith, and that is
el great gain. The C1Hisli~ln who imagines that the reliability otthe
tl'eldilion ~1S historical documents gives certainty to faith should be
~Iartlecl trom rest by historical work. 'This oLight to make it clear
thai Christianity cannot be had as cheaply as one thinks. Secondly,
hisl(1I'ic,d \\'ol'!;. is constantly yielding new and nlOdilled results
obuined from the tradition. By this ll1e,lIlS the Christian faith is
constantly called upon to compare the picture of jesus that it holds
as absolute Il'uth wilh the releltive truth of historical knowledge
l/li,;/uri,;c!It: L:'rkellllllli,;I. ,-'\l1li this helps us not to forget that the
l110St illlport.lnt fact of our lite Cdnnot be given 10 us once for all,
hUI I11U~t he continually grasped \\lith all our souL""

\Vhen lhe hlse supports are eliminated, presumably faith has dear
alld illll11ediale ,lccess to its proper object. AccorJing to Herrmann, the
basis llrClll'isti~lIl faith is the fact of jesus Christ's appearance in history,97
Cod's revelation, through whom anJ through which Christians are as
sured th,lt they coml1lune with God, Historical research is incapable of
provid i ng this i nJ ubi table fact" [zweifel/ose Tals(lche] of jesus Christ be
Cduse historical research can only attain higher or lower degrees of prob
ability. If historical resedrch cannot provide the fact of jesus Christ (IS tlte
basis o/tiulh to modern men and women, this fact must be appropriated
by other means:
U

If.. the person of kSllS is so certain to us Christians that we see
in hil11 the b~lsis of clur faith and the present revelation of God
to us, this conviction is not established by a historical judgment
[liislorisclzes Urleilj. " [t is sOl11ething else entirely that banishes
ell! Joubt froill Ihe picture of Jesus. [fwe have that picture at all, we
have it as Ihe result, not of om own eltorls, but as an effect of the
power of Jesus hi I11seIC)S
%.

Geschichte und Histurie
Herrmann, like Wobbermin and unlike Kahler, is not Willing sill1
ply to equate this indubitable fact of the historic Christ with the biblical
picture of him, For Herrmann there is a necessary distinction between
what he calls the inner life of jesus [rias innere Leben jesu] and the New
Testament picture of him. It is possible that many features of the life nf
jesus presented in the gospels are the product of the evangelis[s' ability [0
create powerful moral and religious symbols, but for the Christi,tn whn
has been touched by the inner life of jesus, all doubt vanishes."" For the
Christian who has experienced the power of the inner life of jesus, histori
cal criticism no longer presents an)' danger beC<lUse it is the power of Ihe
inner life of jesus, not the results of historical criticism of the gospels or
even the New Testament picture of Christ that is preserved in the pre~lch
ing of the church, that is the basis of faith,
Herrmann suggests that the personality of jesus cannot be obscured
or muted by any imperfections or inconsistencies that might appear in
the evangelists' accounts of his life, The power of this personality shines
through those inconsistencies and "give[s\ us courage to believe in
God."IUU It does this at first by the mediation of Scripture, of testimony, or
of preaching, but once one has been touched by the power of this inner
life, all need for mediation vanishes and the believer is left with a direct
experience of the power of jesus' inner life,
Brent Sockness argues that Herrmann interweaves two distinct
strands of argumentation in his discussions of the relationship between
faith and history, First, Herrmann insists on what Sockness calls a "thera
peutic function of historical critical research," whereby false security is
destroyed by emphaSizing the fact that faith lives from what is given in
the present rather than from what in the past is reconstructed on the ba
sis of historical scholarship, SeconJ, Herrmann appeals not to his[()rical

Ihid,()3-o111:'I', 71i-77 I.

':!7. "Whell \\'e Sf)Clk oflhe historic Christ we mean a uniwr)' personal life that speaks

to us frulll the New '['ol,llllellt as the disciple; testimony of faith, Dutlhat, whell we hear
iI, alw,ly' strikes us as a Illiraculous rel'c'ialioll. Thai historical research C,lllnot give us
thi, we k"ow. Ilut lleither will it ever take Ihis from us by allY of ils discoveries; this we
believe, the Illlll'e we experiellce what this piclure uf the glory of jesus works in us." Ibid.,
(',1 [LI. 77 7BI
':!K Ihid., 5':! [I':T, 721 Herrmann names the church - the fellowship of Christians
- elS the lucus "I'thi, picture's eH'ectiwness. It is through the testimony of Christians that
Ihe innl'r life ,,( jesus is medi'Hed to others. But, Herrmann suggests, once one has been
lI11pressed by the p"wer of lhe illner life uf jesus, mediation is 110 longer necessary. Ibid"
5':!-OO 11:'1', 72-731.
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99. "Whenever we are actually able to see Ihe p"rsoll of Jesus, Ihen, ullder the im
pression ot this inner life that breaks through all the veils of the traditioll, we ask 110
more questiolls aboul the credibility ot the narrators. 'TIle question of whc,ther the person
of Jesus belongs to history or fiction is silenced in evnyone who !cdrllS to see II at ,111.
because through il one first experiences what the true reJlity of personal life is." Ihid,
62 [£1',751. For a study ot Herrmann's lheology with an emphasis OIl the experic'llce of
God and the inner life of jesus, sec de Boor's article, puhlished ill two parts as "Der letzte
Grund unseres Glaubens an GOll."
100. Herrmann, Der Verkehr, 63 [ET: Comnwnivl/, 71i1.
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reconstruction of the past, but 10 the certainty of this presently given faith
itselL 1,'1

historic Christ and the biblical picture of Christ, was even less willing to
make a further distinction between Christ as the basis of Llilh and Christ

In order to bolster this appeal to the certainty of presently given

as the content offaith. For him, Christ is both the basis and the content of

fdith, Herrm'lllil makes d distinction between Jesus Christ as the basis of

faith in exactly the same way: as the total historic, biblical Christ.

faith (faith's C'rllnd) and Jesus Christ as the content of faith (f~lith's Inhl1/t).

Herrmann, on the other hand, introduces a further distinction be

He undersl,lllds this distinction to be a crucial one, because any confu
sion in this mdlter Cdn have profoundly negative implications for the
dOllrine OfJUSlilicJlion by faith alone. In his essay "Grund und Inhalt des
CLllIbens:' he delines the basis of faith as "the man Jesus Christ."'I)! The
(()Jltellt of f'lith, on the other hand, is the New Testament picture of the
historic Christ, which is kept ,dive and tl',lIlsmitted through the preach
illg of the church. 'I he content of faith is, to use another term, composed
of (;/I/II!JL'f/S,l!,crliI/lkclI (ideas or thoughts of faith) about Christ. The basis
is ,dways prior to the content, and the content always presupposes and
re-presents the basis. The basis itself is the sole fact of the appearance of
Christ in history dllli the continuing effect of the power of his inner life.
All else is secondary and is ultimately unnecessary for the faith of one
who has (llready been touched by this power. Ifone were to be brought to
faith by the content of faith, by the Glallbensgedl1l1kef/l1bollt Christ rather
than the power u!Christ himself, then faith \"ould essentially be thrown
back upon itself and would become a human work rather than a free
gift of the gr,lcious Cod. Harmann argues that his distinction between
the basis of t',lith and the content of faith places him firmly within the
Refllrlllalion tradition clnd protects his position from charges of works
righteousness. III I
'I h is d isti nct ion marks a signi fican t departure from Kiih ler's position,
!()r example. lIH K;ihler, who was unwilling to distingUish at all between the

tween the inner life of Jesus, which serves as the b'ISis of faith, and the
biblical picture of the historic Christ, which serves ,1S the conlcnt of that

\0 I Sockne", Aguill,.;1 F,,/,.;e Apologetic,.;, 84-85. Sockness draws this conclusion
bdsed lln 111' an,liysis 1)1' Herrmann's review of Ernst TrodlSch's essay, "Die Bedeutung
ekr t ;e,chlchtlichkeit )esu fur den Glauhen:' hut these two slrands run throughout
I krrol<JJlll's \\Iork a=, a
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Herrnldnn, "Crulld und lnhalt des Claubcns," 282.

103 "With these three senlL'nces I ,jctu,jlly stay by the original Reformalion doctrine

ufjuslific,llllll1. It is hence pusslhle for l11e te) lake seriously that failh is experienced by us
Iwt as our ,Mn work, bUI ,jS <..;ud's fret' gift, and Ihat fauh itself is the new life, the nova et
;I'iri/I.ldlli I'i/u, In which we are redc'etned persons." Ibid., 191.
IO.j. "~ihlcr \V<l> certainly' awa,'e ot- HerrlT1,jnn's critiCJlle of his positie1l1, hav
Ing fHlhllShed a rejoinder l\) Herrmdnn in an essay entitled "Crllnd und !nh,jlt des
(:hristengLllIhens: Deckl sich dec geschichlliche Christus mit dem hihlischen'" included
5°

faith. lOS One of the keys to Herrmann's position is the concept oflhe power
of the inner life of Jesus and how this power is rooted in d historic figure
while Simultaneously transcending its historicity (thus making it, <lCcord
ing to Herrmann, impervious to historical skepticism). For Herrlll,lIln,
the question of the reliability or the accuracy of the historical records
about Jesus Christ is rendered moot once an individual has been gripped
by the power of the inner life of Jesus. As Claude Welch puts iI, "llw
question, then, is not what we make oflhe story (by historisch study), but
what the contents of the story make of US."IDI' Herrrnallil discusses this at
length in Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott, and one passage in particular
places his position in a clearer light:
It is precisely the most difficult thing to comprehend in the historic
realityofJesus that sets us free from the tradition, because il finally
imposes itself on liS as some:thing presently etfective on us. Those
who have found the inner life of )c:sus through the mediation of
others, insofar as that has happened, have become free even of that
mediation. They are set free by the significance that the inner life
of Jesus has obtained for those who have seen it. If we have expel'l
enced his power over liS, we need no longer look to Ihe testimony
of olhers to hold fast to his life as some:thing re,jl. We start, indeed,
from the tradition; but we first grasp the fact that the tradition
presents us when we have become aware of the enrichment of Oll!'
in Kahler, Der ,.;ogenWl/lk hi,.;torische Je";Li";, t49-206. 'Chis essay provides much materi,ll
lor a comparison of Kahler and Herrmann, but that particular line ofinCJuiry lies heyond
the scope of Ihis study.
LOS. Tllere is some indication in Der Verkehr that Herrmann ,jlso ,jllempts 10 dilk'r
enliate between the basis and the contenl of failh on the b,lSis of the' classical di"illClielil
hetween the fides 'ILiile creditur and the }ide; qua creditLir: '''Ihe suhjective experience of
the Christian religion cannot he severed from the Ihoughts that in Chrislian dOdrille
one seeks to formulate as the contents 01' faith. 'J hat experience does 11<11 end in mere
feding, but comes to its perfection in those thoughts." Herrmann, Der Vake/lr, 38 1FT:
COllllllunioll,47).

106.

Welch, Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century, 2:52.
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uwn innt'llife by contJct \vith the Living One.... 'lhe appearance
of a f)l'I'SOILllily th'lt bccomes visible to LIS in this \VJY absolutely
cannot be h,lnded over [0 LIS through the communication of oth
c'rs. 11 ariscs ill LIS as the free revelation of the living to the living.
'[ hus also the Inner lift: of JesLis becomes pan of our own reality.
'1lws" who havc eXl)aienced this witl cenainly no longer say that,
stridly sl)eaking, they can cOl1ll>rehend only the tradition of Jesus
,IS something rcal. jeSLIS himself becomes a real power to LIS when
he di,clllses his il]ner life tll LIS, ,] power rh,H we pt'rceive as the best
thing our lifc c()nt,\ins. ltl7

narrative itself and from its author and to regard it as an element of that
reality with which we have to come to terms."111! Toconfuse the power of
the inner life of Jesus with the narratives about that life and thM power is
to confuse the content of faith for the basis of faith.
By detaching the content of the narratives frol\1 the nJrrat'ives them
selves, Herrmann does make great strides toward -enlOving the basis of
faith from the tluctuations of historical research in t<o those Ilanal ivt's. Hut
how is that content gained if not by means of the narrdtive? Herrmann
admits that this must be the case because one nrstl"<lrns of jesus and the
power of his life through Scripture, testimony, or p,-~aching One linds in
and through that testimony the basis of faith, the i 1I1er life o( Jesus and
its power as the revelation of God in history. Christians can rest assured
that the picture of Christ meditated by the church faithfully retlects the
essence of Jesus of Nazareth, even if Herrmann is lIlwilling to base thdt
assurance on any historical judgment. He is convinccd thaI the picture l)f
jesus Christ possessed and handed down by the church is historically dC
curate in its essentials, but he claims that this is a judgment of faith rather
than a result of historical research.
If, as Herrmann argues, the narratives are nece,sary only ,1t an inter
mediate stage to provide the original mediation for the power of the inner
life of Jesus to shine through, after which time they are no longer neces
sary for the one who has been touched by the pm\,el' of jesus' inner life,
the narratives still have an important role to play. nese narratives might
provide an accurate, reliable picture of jesus Christ and the power of his
inner life, or they might, in the end, prove to be unreliable. It is diflicult
to determine how Herrmann hopes to have made the narratives (and his
torical criticism of them) irrelevant for providing the basis offaith simply
by declaring them to be unnecessary once one has been touched by the
power of the inner life of jesus through the mediatiol of those narratives
themselves, while at the same time insisting that fait~ nevertheless has an
accurate picture of the historic Jesus Christ.
Herrmann's position rests on ""hat Sockness has called a "pseudo
historical approach:' in which Herrmann "blocks tho p<lth frolll histori
cal judgments to faith, [but] leaves movement in the opposite direction

'I he (,Ict of lilt' 'l['peardnce of jesus in history is, dccording to
HelTmdnl\, Ilolhil\g olher than the revelation of God.'I!~ TIle fact of the
historic )csus Christ, impressing himself upon men and women and
becomil\g P~lrt of their own reality, is the basis of Christian faith and,
~1Ccording (0 Herrmann, is impervious to historical criticism. It is based
in the historic tradition of the New Testament, but it finally transcends
the n1t.'di'llilln o( history by means of d direct, indeed miraculous effect
of Christ 01\ the il\dividuaLII!') 'The certainty of faith is thus found in the
experiel\Ce of this eilect within the individual rather than in any external
"~)rop.

vVith this distinctiol\ between the basis of faith and the content of
faith ,Ind with this emphasis on the immediate effect of the historic Christ
on the individual, Herrmann hopes to have described a faith that is ul
timately ul\lrouhled by any historical inquiry into its basis. TIle question
st iII rem,] ins, however, of how successful Herrman n was in his attempt to
remove fdith from the vicissitudes of history.
Unlike Kahler, Herrmann is Willing to grant historical criticism free
access to the biblical texts. He is free to do this because he does not ulti
mately base faith on the reliability of the biblical accounts of jesus Christ,
but rather on the power of the inner lite of jesus that lies behind those
Il<lrratives. Or as Herrmann puts it, "It is thus perfectly clear that we are
in a very good position to detach the content of a narrative both from the
t07. H~ml1~nn, Del' Verkc:hr, 60-6\ [ET: Conllllunioll, 73-741.
IOH,

Ihid, 40-4') WI', 59).

lO'), L1s~whL'r~,

ill ,II] ,micle cntitled "Der geschichtlich~ Christus d~r Grund Ul1seres
identifies this direct effect of the inner life of Jesus on
Ih" individu~1 as ~ miracle: "I have emphasized that Christ as the basis of failh bears
wlt!tnl himself a claim lh'll cxc"eds every human dimensiun and is simply miraculous."
rkmnanll, "[leI' g~schlchtliche Chrislus:' 164.

<..;I~lIh"I1S:' H~rrlll,]nn cxpli~itly
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liD, Herrmann, Dec Verkehr, 58 rET: Commllnion, 71).
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open.""1 Sockness cPllLludes that Herrmann fimlily sutlers from a lack of
hoth "his\oric,t1 nerve and theological imagination":
"1I1Clll,)gicdlly speaking, the insistence that the portrait of Jesus
Illll,;t (aithl'ully rdlect the ,1Clllal man jesus of Nazareth or else it
is III<:n:/)' .\ licli'Hl or a product of the poetical imagination, and
thadmc ulltrue, betrays Herrmalln's lack of appreciation for the
plldical ,llld rqHesent,lti,)lldl ch,lracler and function of the bibli
cal texts. ll ;

\rVohhcrmin's Appraisal and CritilJue of Herrmann's Position
VVohhermin's critique of Herrmann's position is the Illost subtle of his
trealments of the !()ur theologians he has chosen to engage in his essay.
WohherIllin's j1,)sition is <ILtually quite close to Herrmann's in many sig
nificant rcspeds, illcluding the rejection of the capability of historical
research to l)J'(lVidc the basis ,)f faith, the positive evaluation of historical
research as a necessdrY means of destroyillg false supports tor faith, and
the insistence lhat rhere Illusl be some distinction between rhe historic
dlld the hlhlical Christ (contra Kahler).
CI hese si m i1Mi lies correspond to some shared weaknesses as well.
130th are ultimately uncle'lr on the precise nature of the relationship
hetween the posilive and negative roles of historical-critical research,
especially vis-a-vis the "inner life" of Jesus or the "essential elements" of
the piclure of Christ. Both intend to free faith from the vicissitudes of
history by estahlishing the certainty of faith in the religious experience of
the etl!cacy (\rVobbermin) or power of the inner life (Herrmann) of the
hiqoric Christ, yet both maintain that this certainty will withstand rig
orous historical scrutiny without any justification for that claim beyond
the continuing existence of the Christian faith. Both succumb to what
Sock ness cliled in Herrmann's case a "pseudo-historical approach" that
fails to take seriously the pOSSibility that rigoroLls historical criticism will
undermine the essential elements of their respective pictures of Christ.
WobberIll in's critiq ue of Herrmann and the differences between their
respecrive positions can be distilled into one main point with two lines of
argument. ft concerns the picture of the historic Christ, subdivided into a

Ill. So.:kncs>, '''I h~ IJC',ll anJ thc Historical," 386.
112. Ihid.,

3~7.
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concern about the relationship between the basis of faith and the (oillent
of faith, and a concern aboLlt the place of the resurrection ill thM picture.
Unlike Kahler, Herrmann is not willing to equate the historic Chrisl
with the total biblical picture of him. To do so, HerrrTI<lnn suggesrs, is to
confhte Christ as the basis offaith (the power of his inner life) with Christ
as the content offaith (the C/a/./bensgedollkert about Christ). The inner life
of Jesus shines through these ideas of faith alld' is expressed ill them, but
it IllUSt be kept distinct. Otherwise the resulting picture of Jesus would
be vulnerable to historical criticism and would def)end Oil the results of
historical research, only ever attaining probable reli"bilily rather than the
certainty of the direct experience of the power of Jesus' inner life itself
Wobbermin rejects this separation of Christ as the h,lSis of Llith
and Christ as the content of faith because, in his estimation, it divorces
the historic Christ from the total historic context by which he becomes
present to faith. He fears that this separation of the b<lsis and the contellt
threatens to throw the picture of Christ back into the realm of histori
cal research and historical judgments, requiring historical verificalion of
the accur<lcy of that picture before it can become the object of faith. He
recognizes Herrmann's intention to bypass historiGll judgments by em
phaSizing the immediate effects of the power of the inner life of jesus, but
he questions whether Herrmann succeeds in doing so:
To the extent that the person of Jesus Christ is taken out or the
total historic context in which he stands, he now becomes, sn to
speak, a historical figure in a narrower sense, i.e., such a figure
who is not already ensured b)' Illeans of the tOlal historic colJtext
in which he stands and to which he is included as an indispcnsable
link, but rather one who invites historical research and lirsl could
be ensured by it. l13

For Wobbermin, the continuing efficacy of the picture of Christ
within the Christian tradition (the "total historic context"), not historical
research, is what ultimately authenticates the picture of Christ. Herrmann
Il3. "In delll lv/afte, als die Persoll lesll Christi aflS <lml gescllichtlidwlI CeS/llllt;;wlllll
nUlllwnge, ill dem sie stel,t, hernusgellollllllell winf, wird sie ebell ZII eiller ill/ engen'lI
Sillne so ZlIllellnendell historischell CrojJe, d.h. zu eilla solchell, die niehl 5"1111/ .llIr"l .1(11
geschich/lichen Cesallltwsanmrellhallg, ill del/l sie ste!1I filld "ell/ sie als /111\'euiujJ.:rI/ches
Che.l eingejiigt isl, hinreiehend siehergestel/t ist, sOlldall die ZII eiller historisdl(1l De
tailuntersuehung all.fJordert Wid erst dureh eille solehe sicherges/elII werdell kOllllle." \lVoh
bamin, Ceschichle und His/orie, 45. Here again is the COIlCCrtl tu dilrercntiatc he'lwc'ell
the primary character of Ceschichle and Ih~ sCLOl1dary characlcr of Hi,torie.
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claims th,lt the inner life of jesus elccomplishes this same objective by the
dteL't o( ilS pllWer, hut Wobhermin claims that this is not possible if the
inner life lll' ksus is not understood within the larger historic context in
which lhat \)iclure conlinues to be present and effective, To separate the
inner life of jesus rrolll the IMger historic context of its efficacy or effects
is, in Wohhermin's estimation, a Selcritice of the historic character of that
inner Iilc,
Wohherillin contends that lhis danger is only latent in Herrmann's
lle,l[menl bec,lLlse Herrillann does not completely separate the basis from
lhe content or faith,'14 'IlH~ inner life of Jesus as the basis of faith is still
handed down through the Christian tradition and is therefore not com
pletely distinct (rom it. The "totdl historic context" is slill a part of thai
picture, even ir it is secondary to it and derived from it.
However, Wohbcrmin argues thelt Herrmann's position succumbs to
dirliculties because he has not carefully distinguished between Geichichte
and llis/orie Such a distinction would require Herrmann to rethink the
distinction hetween Christ as the basis offaith and Christ elS the content
of raith. Wohhermin argues that Herrmann, by distinguishing between
the helsis or f,lith ,1Ild the content of faith, requires a historical judgment
to delennine th,ll h'lSis. Because Herrmann claims that this basis is the
inner life of Jesus as it lies behil/d the texts of the New Testament and as
it is distind from what Wobberll1in calls the "total historic context" in
which it continues to be present and efficacious, Wobberll1in contends
thM Herrm,lnn is forCed to rely on historical judgments to determine lhe
chMaCler of Ihis inner life of Jesus:
Such ,In allempt, according to the nature of the matter at hand,
can nnly he cMrkd out by means of historical research; where it
is undertaken, it thus leads to a historical approach in a narrower
~ense, ~o to speak. Herrmann's position will not be able to elude
the force of thi~ fact. [n fact, at this point a "hi~torically" oriented
~erie~ of thoughts crosses his position and destroys it. For along
with the "historical" series oflhoughts, their relativity, their hypo
thetical character, and their probability also enter into Herrmann's
picture of Chri~t.ll;
114. Ihld .. 4'1. '1 IllS is obvillusly

COil t r<lrY to

what Herrmann himself insisted.

Geschichte Lind Histurie
Nowhere does this difference between Herrmann and Wobberrnin
come into clearer relief than it does in the question of the resurrection of
jesus, The decisive question in terms of the resurrect ion is whet her the el
ement that came to expression in resurrection faith C,Hl he Sel)ar,ll~d from
the New Testament picture of Christ as a historic fact. While HelTl11,lnn
wants to make such a distinction, at least provisionally, Wohhermin argues
that such a distinction must unconditionally be rejected, For Wohbermin,
"as soon as such a separation is made, the historic picture of Ch riSI ceases
to be, in our judgment, what it always has been according tl) its historic
existence and also what it is and means in the present."III'
In the case of the resurrection the question is not one of Hiitorit: (it
has been dismissed by the nature of the malter at hand) but is f<1ther ,1
question of how Geschichte is denned and understood. Because Herrl11,lnn
wants to distinguish between the inner life of jesus lying bertil/I! Ihe texls
of the New Testament and the narratives and trad it ion abou/ the power of
his inner life, Vvobbermin accuses Herrmann offailing 10 account for the
essential significance of the resurrection for the toted historic picture of
Christ. 1l1e resurrection is significant precisely because il is presupposed
by the entire Christian tradition, from the New Test,lment itself through
to the present day. Any attempt to "go behind" the tradition to the histo
ricity of the resurrection event itself necessarily requires an inappropriate
dependence on historical research and historical judgments, which can
not prOVide any foundation for Christian faith. But whereas Herrmann
understands this to mean that the resurrection itself should nol and
cannot constitute an essential element of the basis of faith. Wobhermin
insists that it must constitute an essential element of the historic picture
of Christ precisely because the resurrection is presupposed by the entire
Christian tradition as an event of decisive and enduring (i,e. historic) sig
nificance and efficacy.
Again, the crux of this debate on the place of the resurrect ion
within the picture of Christ is the difference between Herrmann's and
sie all diesem PUllkt dureh e;l1e 'historiseh' orielltierle Gedllllkellreihe gekreuzt Wid UlII
iilre Ges"'hlossenheil gebraeht. Denn II/il der '/listorisdlell' Gedwlkwreihe kOr/llllt 1111 vcr·
meidlich alleh deren Relativitiit, ihr hypothetiseher oder Wahrscheillliehkeils-CilUnlklcr III
das Herrl1lanl/sche Chr;stllsbild hineir/." Ibid., 42.

115. "Eill solc/ler Vrrsl/eh kllllli llha der NlltLif da Sac/Ie wjolge lIL1r lIIit den /'v(ilteJlI
hislorisdlCT Forsdllllig 1ll/sgeJiihrt werdell; "'0 er witemollllliell Ivird,fiihrt er also z" eiller
illl ellgerell Sill II so ZLI lIellllerll/ell historisdlell Bernlclilltngsweise. Delli Zw'ltlge dieses
Sudlverll,.I!t; >I'm/ sieh lIL1eh Herrllllllllls Positioll lIieht entziehell k iJIIII ell. Tatsiiehlieh wird

116. "Sobll/d eine so/che TrenllLlllg ernstlieh vollzogen IVird. hiirt }en6 Gild fI.E. LIlI/;
das Zli seitl, IVas es seinelll gesdli"'htliehen Bestan"e Iladl il1lll/er gewesell lSI, WII;; es >I'il/ell/
gesehiehtlkhl'll Bestande naeh afleh geget/lviirligpir lIIlS is! lind bedel/tet." Ibid, 36.
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Wobbermill's defil1iliol1 of the picture of Christ as the basis of faith.
Hernnanl1 linlits the essential clements 10 the "inner life" of ksus, while
Wobberlllin places lhese elements within a wider context, namely the
!)icture o!' (;hrisl l)reSenl witllin the "total historic context" of the New
'I'eslalnellt al1d lhe Christian traditiol1. For Herrmann, including the ele
ments of1he Ir,ldiliol1 in the picture of Christ moves away from the il1ner
life of Jesus

,IS

the b,ISis of faith al1d tow,lrd the Glaubensged<7nken that

are the (()l1teIl1 l)f failll, and therefore such a move Illust be rejected. For
Wohbenn i 11, IiIn it i I1g the picture of Christ to the inner li fe of jesus in (and
behind) lh~' New 'J'esl,lInelll [)icture requires historical and psychological
judgments lhal are ditlicult if not impossible to make.

Geschichte und Historie
resurrection has always been included in the picture of Christ, (rot)] the
New Testament to the present:
For us it is only a question of whether the element th,lt found its
expression in resurrection faith is to be sq)arated frol11 the [)ktur<:?
of Christ that is gIven to LIS frol11 the New Testal11ent as a histnric
bct, of whether it is to be separated from it at least provisionally, ,15
Herrmann wants to do. And this question, it ilpp<:?ars tOllS, l11ust he
answered with an lInconditional no. As soon as such ,I sq)ar,ltion
is seriously made, that flicture, in our opinion, ceases 10 be what il
always was according to its continued historic existence and also
what it presently is and means for LIS according to its continued
historic existence. 119

Hellm,1I111 does not ,1rgue for a wholesale rejection of the Christian
lradiliol] il1 ilS significance for the picture of Christ, and Wobbermin

According to Wobbermin, Herrmann's position finally SUCCUI1lbs

righ Ily ac kl10wledges th is. Trad itiol1 plays an import,1I1 t role in Herrmann's

to a dependence on the historisch thinking it seeks to avoid By refus

discussion, for Ihe piclure of Christ is present and handed down in the
lr,ldiliOll lhrough the proclamatiol1 of the gospel. II; But tradition always

ing to include the resurrection in the essential traits of the life of Jesus,
Herrmann isolates the picture of the historic Christ froI1l the wider his

serves as lhe means by which the picture of Christ is represented and is

toric context of that picture, which, Wobbennin argues, ll1ust include

l1ever p,lrt oflhat picture itself; it is, once again, a matter of distinguishing

the resurrection. By excluding the resurrection from the picture of the

between the b,ISis offaith al1d lhe content offaith. 'Where Herrmann sees
a clear distinction between the person of jesus Christ and the tradition
concerning him, Wobbermin sees a unity.ll" Wohbermin prefers to speak

historic Christ, there is then the temptation of considering the persoll of
jesus as a historical rather than historic figure, insofar as that picture is
then limited to the e<1rthly life of jesus.

of lhe picture of Christ as standing within a much broader historic con
text, and he accuses Herrmann of rel1loving the person of Christ fro III this
context. vVubberlllin helieves it is necessary to include the resurrection in
the historic picture of Christ as the object of faith precisely because the

\Vobbermin's criticisms of Herrmann remain subtle and limited es
sentially to the two points described above. Their respective positions are
finally quite c1ose.I'o Both agree on the necessary neg,ltive role of his
torical criticism, both question the benefits and even the possibility of

It7. "," (:hrlSiiallity Ihere is Ilolhing else COllsislently as necessary as the preaching
01' Chris!." Hcrrlllanll, Dt'r Verke!u', 1j5 [ET CLi/WIIWlioll, 80]. Herrlllallll also nOles the
IlllpOrlallCe of trJJitioll ",hen he suggests 'I relationship bet",een the person oflesu> anJ
apostoliC preaehillg: "We ha"e the person of Jesus only in the preaching of the Jisciples
who believed in him." Ibid., 93 [cT, 1131.
II~. f Icrrtll'"1n'S an\1 Wobhermin's conflicting posilions on the rdation Oflhc person
o( (:hrisl III the Ir,tdilinn COllceril ing him atllicipales a similar lkbalC in the miJJIe of the
tweillielh century (onccrlling the reldtion of the early Christian kerygma to the procla
mation of lesns, addressed in the work of RuJolfBullmann, EhcrharJ Ji.ingd, anJ others.
Sec, e.g., l\lIlimdllll, Dels Verhii!tnis d2r IIrchristlichell ChriSllishotschuft ZlinI hislorischell
!e>w II'T "'1 he Primitive' Christian Kerygma and the Historical Jesus"] anJ )linge!,
PUII!IIS wn! jeSlI$. Wobbcrmin's po>ilion is inlluenccd by Sehleiermacher's, particularly
SchlcicrmJeher's discussion of Ihe unbroken unity of Ihe influence of the Redeemer on
the Jiscipks and the teslimnny orhis influence through the proclamation of the church.
58

I 19. "Es Jragt sic'h /iir W1S 1I1Ir, ob VOII dem Christ IIshilde, dus III1S VOIII NeilI'll Tcstamcnl
her ais geschichtlicller Tatbesland gegebell ist, das I'vloment, dllS im AIl(erstehllngsbhlldlL'll
sei/1ell AlIsdrllck geJlllldeli hal, iiberhallpt Zli trenllell isl; ob es 1'011 ihlll welllgs!clls vorliill
fig, !Vie Herrmann lviII, ZII Irenllen isl. Ulld diese Fmge scheilll III1S !1"dillgWlgsios VerJIelll(
werden Zli miissell. Sobn!d eille solche Trellllllng crJlsllich vollzogell wlrd, h,;rt jellcs Sitd
II. E. all;; das ZJI seill, was es seinem geschichtlichell Bestelllde IIc.JcI, illllller gcwcsell 1St,
was es seinelll geschichtlichen Beslalllie nach allch gegenwiirligfiir WIS ist 1I11d bedelllet."
Wobbermin, Geschichte 1I11d Hislorie, 36.

120. Wobbermin concludes that his position r<:presents somelh ing of d "Ill iddle Jine"
between Kahler's and Herrmann's, although he also c1dil11s thdtthis W<lS not his intention.
He acknowleJges hoth Kiihler's anJ Herrmann's influence, along with Adol!" l-Iarnack~,
anJ Julius Kaftan's, in devdoping his Ihoughts on the distinction between Geschich/e anJ
Historie anJ on the problem of faith anJ history Although Wohhermin illlplies that hls
position falls roughly equiJistanl from Kahler's and Herrmann's, after closer analysis it
appears that his pOSition falls closer to Herrmann's Ihan 10 Kdhler's. Ibid., 40-47.
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eqLl,ltil1g; the historic Christ with the tOlal biblical picture of him, and
hoth cllkll1pllO hnd some certainty for faith independent of the tluctuat
ing r,,'sults of historical-critical research. l·hey claim to have found this
certaillty in dilferent places, but in the end their positions suffer from the
same weclknesses. 130th Herrmann and VVobbermin claim to have avoided
Ill<lkillg faith dependent on historiczd juogments, but hoth positions are
more 0l'en to criticism than either is willing to admit. In Herrmann's case,
by limilil1g the basis of f<lilh to the earthly life of Jesus it is difficult to
determine how he manages to claim that he has removed faith from the
vicissitudes of historicdl research. And vVohbermin, by claiming to have
gu,lr,lntt:ed the picture of Christ by tracing its eltects through the his
lory of Ihe C1nisl ian trad it ion, is ull i mately maki ng a historical judgment
without 'lllmilting that it is, in fact, a historical judgment. How else but
by h isl oric,li i nqu iry could one hope to isolate the essen tial fealu res of the
picture of Christ as il is effective and efficacious throughout the history of
the Christidn tradition? Here again it is helpful to recognize the implicit
d ist i11Ct ion in 'vVobberm in's essay between Gescltidtle ano its effects or
efllc<lcy, hut Ihis is a distinction vVobbermin never made explicit.
Similarly, bOlh Herrrllann and vVobbermin contend that faith can
conrldenlly dSSUI11~ thdt it has dn accurate picture of the historic Jesus
Christ, a confidence that is bas~o either in the power of the inner life
of jesus (Herrmdnn) or the efticacy of the historic Christ within the
Christian lraoition (Wobbermin). This is anything but a foregone conclu
sion. 'I he pOSSibility will exist, in both cases, that faith's confidence in the
historicdl reli,lbility of its object is mistaken. But, as B. A. Gerrish notes,
"N~ither Herrmann nor Wobbermin, any more than Kahler before them,
could resist the temptation to move back from the confidence of faith to
contidenc~ in the historicity of the Synoptic Jeslls."l!1
1n fdcl, it is difficult to see how Wobbermin has made any Significant
advances beyond Herrmann's position l !! There are differences, but ulti
malely their positions are open to the same criticisms, especially in terms
of th~ role of historical criticism and the extent to which both have or
have nol avoided lhrowing faith back into the vicissitudes of history. Both
(;erri,11, "Je,;u" Ivlylh, '1nd History," 3'1.
122. ()Ile advance, which only become'S clear as an aJvance wilh ,om" historical Jis
lance, IS Wobbl'rmin's Insist"nce thdt the resurrection must belong to the basis of failh.
·1 he resurreclion and it; significance for faith will become a cenlrallheme in th" Ih"ology
of the 1111d- Lwentit'lh century, esp"cially that uf Herrmann's stud"nt, Rudolf Bultmanl1.
121.

Geseh ich te II rId Hisloril:!
attempt to locate the certainty of faith outside the redlm of historical re
search by emphasizi ng the i m medi<lte preSence and efl1cacy of the piclu re
of Christ as mediated by the Christian tradition. But this in itself does
not remove the picture of Christ from the redllll of historical judgments.
Charles Carlston's criticism of Kahler actually dpplies to Herrmann and
Wobbermin as welL
Tht' principlt' [thaI genUinely historicIlfigures ,Ire known til their
effects) must not be extended so broadly as 10 just ify JII subsequellt
interpretation of ali historical figures; it IllUst kave rOom !()r a
negative critical function, judging the concinnity betwt'en the his
torical personage and later interpretdtion. Neitht'r the Pmtest,lnt
Principlt' nor serious historical study can survive oth"'rlvise.
TIle effects of a historical figure Jre, at JedSI in theolT, know
able by the Sdme methods as the figure himself; a decision of f;lith
is not called for in winnOwing the Napoleon tradition in POs(
Napoleonic times. 111e apOStolic understanding of Jesus in this
sense IS dvailable through historical inquiry.'2.;
It is only later, with the development of the religio-psychologic.d
and the historic et·hcacy of
circle between personal religious
the picture of Christ, and with it the attempt to build on the distinction
between Gesehiehte and Historie in a broader and mOre systenlalic Context,
that Wobbermin begins to distance himself from Herrmann's position.

experienc~

Wilhelm BOUssel
The fourth and final figure Wobbermin conSiders in his section of ap
praisals and critiques of previous positions is Wilhelm Bousset. Likely the
least familiar of the four figures, Bousset taught at Goltingen ano GieGen
and was One of the founders of the religiml;geschichtliche Sd/llIr.:.

123.

•
12 1

His

Carl.,ton," Biblicislll or Historicislll?" 35.

12~.
religioJ1sgeschichtlich~

There is surprisingly litlle lit"rature on Bousset, considcring his r"k in lilllllding
th"
Schllie.
only CO/llprehcnSive sluJy uf Boussci JS d disserta
tion by Anthunie Frans Verheu/e entitleJ Wilhelm BOllssd, Leben lind Werk. Vcrhcuk
also sketches the COntours of the Jebak' concerning thc distinction bct""t'n Ge:;clliclltt'
and Historic from Kiihl"r to Pannenberg in an artick entitled "'Historic,' en '(;c'sc!l1chlc.'"
He brielly Jiscusses Wohbermin's dislinclion as a prt'Cursor qf llUltl11ann's <lnd wonders
Why \<Vobbermin'$
work ul1lhe JistinctioJl has (101 played a largc'r role;11 Ihe work nf/,lIer
gt'nt'rdtiuns
of theologidJls.

~ille

iiI
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l1\ost SigllilicJllt works are historical studies of the origins of Christianity,
of which Kyrins Unis/ns is perhaps the best known. 125
At the fifth World Congress for Free Christianity and Religious
Prugress, held in Herlin in 1910, Rousset delivered a paper entitled "Die
Kedeulung der Person Jesu fLlr den Glauben."llo In his paper Bousset at
LelllfHs to Ill;linlain Ihe signitlcClllce of the person of jesus for faith without
lhrowillg Llith h,lCk illtO a dependence on the fluctualing results of his
loriel! rese,lrch. He IlHlves rrolll a discussion of earlier attempts 10 solve
Ihis 11rohlelll (rrom Ihe "older rationaliSIll" to Schleiermacher to Ritschl)
10 an all;llysis of lhe cOlltlicling assuillptions of science and religion, and
hlldll)' 10 il conslructive proposal for securing a faith that is not subject to
the ullcerLailllics of his tori Cd I kllowledge.
'[1k' prohlelll, as BousseL ullderstands it, is the problem of faith and
hislory <111(1 their relaliollship to one another. As long as theologians at
teillpl 10 hase fdith on historic,ll particularities (e.g., the atoning death
or Christ, Ilis illiler life, or his messianic self-consciousness), faith will
contillue Lo depend to a gre;lter or lesser degree on the results of historical
rese;lrch illto his person and work, Bousset is not willing seriously to en
tertain Drews's thesis that Jesus of Nazareth never existed, but, assuming
that he did ill lact exist, what Cdn he known with allY historical certainty
about his person and his work? Not very Illuch, finally:
\Vhal we kllow of the pragmatiC context of his life would fit on a
Single shcct or' paper. The [,reaching or the gospel of Jesus is an of
(Cll insoluble web of conlillunity tradition and possibly authentic
words of lhe nlJster. 'vVh,1I our gospels hand down concerning the
uilique sl'lf-consciousness of Jesus and its forms, and therefore of
the inner life of his personality, is overshadowed by the dogma of
Ihe c-ol11l1lul1ity. ,,;

Geschichte

WId

Historie

The dubious character of the New 'T'estaillent wilness raises the ques
tion of how willing Christians should be [0 entrusl the cert;linty ur their
faith to the fluctuating results of historical research inlo thal witness.
Bousset suggests that this question is most pressing for the liberdllhe,)I
ogy of his day, because, in his estimation, modern liberal theology is ch;\I'
acterized by a "historically [geschichtlich] conditioned anti-rationJlism"
that contradicts both Lessing's insistence that accidental hisiuriulilruths
cannot serve as proof of necessary truths of reilson and Kant's principle ot'
the illustrative rather than the demonstrative character of hisrory.J28
By attempting to base faith in the historical person of ksus, wheth
er from the side of the teaching or gospel of Jesus or from the side or
his person and the impulse lhat proceeds from him, liberal theology is
forced to consider the question of historical accur(1cy and reli'lbiliLy. And
this, Sousset suggests, means that "the looming pOSSibility that perhaps
we know very little about the personal life of Jesus, so lillie Ih,1I il does
not present an impressive, vivid picture, must seriously threatell lhdl
view:"29
All of the attempts to base the certainty and content of failh in his
tory are, as Sousset puts it, "oppressed by singular ditnculties." In order to
move beyond and perhaps overcome these difficulties, faith must seek an
other foundation, one that is outside of history, That founJation, ROUSSe!
proposes, is available in reason:
History [/-listorie], earnestly and vigorously prosecuted, points be
yond itself and compels us to seek another fOUlllhltion outside of
history, and that foundation would be reason [Ratio] .... Religioll
is something innate in human beings, understood 011 the basis of
the neceSSity of its rational capacity; religion is not borne to hu
man beings from outside them, thrust upon them from above by
revelation, and it does not rest on supernatural revelation in the
specific sense of the word 13u

125. I\UlIssl'I, Kyrius ellr;;I"s lET: 1\)'1';"; ellr;;I,,; i.
12". !l0l1",1, "Ill, lledt'UIUl1g ller Person kSlI nil' den Glauben." Wobbermin
al", deliVered a palxl' al Ihis congress, enlitled "Aufgab~ und B~delltung del'
l,(dig1llnsps}'ehulugil'." Olher preselll~rs ineluded ."'dulf Harnack, Hermann Gunkel,
alld hllsl Trul'lisch. Wubbermin lVas in attendance and heard Boussel deliver his paper,
alld h, recJl1s Ih,lt h, iml11,di,lIcly IOl1k BOUSSel <bide and remarked Ihal their positions
M, ultimately quill' cluse in Illany important respects, except for their respective jlldg
nl,llts uf thl' re!'lIillnship b~l\Veen Gesell/chle and Histurie. Wobberl11in, Geschichte Lind
[-lis/uric, 4/\

127. Buu"el.

Religion, then, is not based in history or in historic events at all. 11 is
an "original capacity [urspriingliches Vermogen] of the humall being" that
unfolds within history hut is not based in historyUI By basing religion
128 Ibid., 293.
129 Tbid.,296.
130 Tbid, 298.

"['ll~

l\cdl'lIlung del' Persoll Jesu," 292.
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131. Ibid., 298-99.
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in re,lSon ralher than in history, Bousset has moved religion to the realm
of ide,ls Ideas, he suggests, do not need the authority of history; rather,
ide,ls arc Ihe norm by which individual historic personalities and events
,Ire llle'lsurcd."1 his applies to all historic personalities and events, includ
ing Ihe person of'Jesus Christ.
Here, however, is where the "old" rationalism erred, according to
Boussel.' 'e '1 he old rdtionalism concludes from this series of arguments
Ih"t history has no medning for religion, that it is merely a crutch that is
used to raise oneself up to the world of ideas and is then discarded. This
would he lrue, Boussel suggests, in the realm of science and mathematics.
But religious ideas Jre not propositions like those of science and mathe
matics, which are logically demonstrable. Religion, according to Bousset,
concerns the idea of Ihe meaning and value of existence rSillll und Wert
des L)useillsj, calegories Ihal Jre completely foreign to science UJ
Trut hs o( science ,1l1d trut hs of rei igion, then, are two fundamentally
different cLlsses of truth. Science is concerned with the tangible, meaning
that the Ill,llerial, lhal which persists in space and time, is ultimate truth
t<)I" science. Religion, on lhe other hJnd, is concerned with ideas. But re
ligious f"ith does nOI live immediately from ideas, because, according to
Boussel, ide,lS Jlways remain incomprehensible and ungraspable on their
own. 'rhey require symbolizJtion to be grasped and comprehended: "the
worlJ o( elem il y can only become conceivable and objective [gegenstan
dlichj when Ithese iJeJs] shimmer transparently through the world of
tillitude. The poet's words contain the Jeepest truth: 'All that is past is only
J pdrable.'" 1'1

symbolic knows no linear progress: "here preSides the unpredicl'lbililY of'
the individual, of the genius and the hero."[J"
In this sense it is possible to speak ofa relalionship between r~lith Jnd
history. The great religiOUS personalities (of which jesus IS certainly one)
continue to exert a powerful inHuence in the history of the cOtllnlLlnilies
that emerged and developed around them. But the signil1cance of these
personalities is not primarily historic. Theil"Significance is rooted in their
value as symbols. Bousset suggests that the gre<ll religious pers\)nalities
not only create the symbols of faith; they themselves becolI/e th<ll symbol
for the community of faith. So in the case of jesus, he IlOt only cre,lled the
symbolism of the gospel; he himself became the symbol of Ihe gospel. I (~
With this move to consider the symbolic character of religiOUS per
sonalities, Bousset hopes to have removed the person of jesus from the
vicissitudes of history and the tluctuations of historical reseJrch. Whell
Jesus Christ is understood as a symbol rather than as 3 hiSlorical per
son, the question of history ceases to be the dOlllin<lnt and dominating
question it has been in the history of modern liberal theology. "I here is
no longer any need to delineate what might be historically accur,lIe ami
demonstrable from the later additions of the early Christian comillunity,
and there is no longer any need to protect faith from the results of histori 
cal research:

It is in this sense that history must be understood as significant for
f<lith In history, nJked ideas are clothed in symbols that convey their
truth to human beings. In terms of history, too, there is a fundamental
difference between science and religion. For science, the past always re
cedes further and further into the distance. II' is, to use Bousset's colorful
imJge, merely "fertilizer t<)r the future [Diingerfiir die Zukwyi]:'135 But in
religion (as in art) the past remains alive for the present; the realm of the

It comes down to the symbol and the picture itself, not,

al this
point, to ultimate truth and reality. "nlat lies behind the $)'Illools,
in the immovable, God-given depths of hUlllan reason and in the
eternal value of ideas. The symbol serves for illustration, not for
demonstration. Therefore we also make the renlarkable observa
tion that the picture of Jesus, as his immediate comlllunity pre
sented it in the gospels, remains and will remain more dfective as
poetry and truth than as any historical attempts at ('econstruction,
precise as they might beDS This faith does nOI inLjuire into Ihe
historic reality in a n.lrrow sense, out into the rc:ligious and the
morally practical; it stops, consciously or unconsciously, at the

BOllssct IlcVcT Ilames .IIlY rq.lrescnlJlives of Ihe "elld ralielnalism."
133. Ihid., JOO.
l :\4. IbiLl., J02. 'I he [me! is C,)etbt, and the line ''Alles Vergiingliche ist nllr ~in
(;kIChllIS" is ('rom tbt' linal chnrlls of the lasl aCI elf Fawl. It is also tht epitaph eln the
tombstolle ()f tbe poel Klit'l Tucholsky.
l.l5. tlousset, "Die rkdcutllng <ler Person Jesu," 303.

136. IbiJ. 130usset's Kyrios Christos is partly J~V()teJ 10 an,llyzing Ihe (lIlIic stalliS ",.
Chrisl, in which dements of the genius anJ the hero are certainly presellt.
137. Boussel, "Die I3eJelilung Jer Person )csu:' 304.
138. "Poetry and Trllth" I Dichtllng lind WaiJrheitJ is the liile of C"e1h~'s alilohitlg'
raphy. Bousset was almost certainly awar~ of Ihis conneclion, as he had already ljll()leLl
Goethe (withollt naming him) earlier in his paper. See Goethe, G,,~tlles Wake, vol. 5,
Dichtung und Wahrheit rET: Goethe;' Collected Works, vols, 4-5, Fn)}/1 tHy LiJt-I.
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picture.
. And if science were to pronounct: the most extreme
verdicI Ih,\! ksus did not exist, faith will not be lost, because it
rt.:st, on it> own intcrnal foun,Laion and, moreover, the pictllre of
Jcsus in the guspels would nevertheless remain, an,i even ifonly as
139
great podry. still as podry of t:ternal symbolic signiticance.
'I he value or the gospels does not rest in their historical veracity but

in their C,ljldcity poetiol\y and symbolically to convey the "eternal truths
of faith," And if the gospels are understood in this way, as the product of
"poelic fantasy" rather than as hislorical documents, then, Bousset be
lieves, il is ~lill possible [0 confess that "the Logos became flesh and we
heheld his glt)ry.",·,ll
Kous~C1 hopes 1'0 have removed faith from the vicissitudes of his
torical re:-oe,lrch by completely removing the basis of faith from history,
estahlishing it in reaSon instead, There might be a historic basis of faith
t)r there might not; the qUestiOll of historiciry is irrelevant. What matters
mosr is the power of the symbol of JesUS ChrisI' to convey what Bousset
calls the "eternal truths of faith." the symbol of Jesus Christ exerts a
pUlverful influence in the Christian tradition, and it is this symbol that
serves as t he basis of fairh, There is an underlying truth, but by itself it is
incumprehellsible. It requires poetic, symboliC representation in order to
be understood.
1"01' l)ousset, then, faith is not dependent on history at all. It is, as
he candidly admits, a m,llter of faith resting on its own internal, rational
found<llion. Kousset has removed faith from the vicissitudes of history,
but he h<ls m'lde faith its own product, a move that is difficult to defend as
somehow remaining true to the Protestant tradition,l~1 He seeks to avoid
the prohlem of faith and history altogether by turning to a rational foun
d,ltion for faith. in the tradition of, for example, Lessing, Kant, and Jakob
Friedrich Fries. 'll And while his solution does make faith completely in
dependent of the results of historical research, it will not be a satisfactory
solution to the prohlem of faith and history for those who still want to

Wobbermin's Appraisal and Critique of Bousser's Position
Like Bousset, vVobbermin is concerned to remove the basis of faith from
the vicissitudes of historical research, Unlike Bousset, he is not willing to
divorce faith completely from any historic foundat ion. All ofWohberll1in's
criticisms of ROUSSel's position are based on one fundamental concern,
namely the lack of terminological precision when discussing history and
historical research. Bousset uses the terms gt:schidlflidl and hislorisch
interchangeably, and Wobbermin attributes many of his own misgivings
to this lack of terminological precision in Bousset's paper. The question
of whether Bousset himself might admit the possibility of greater clarity
by means of such a distinction is left unasked. For Wobbermin. Bousset's
position would be much improved were such a distinction (onsistently
employed.
Wobbermin agrees with Bousset that the results of historicll re
search cannot serve as the basis of faith. To claim to do so is to give up
the security of faith from the outset. W Wobbermin further agrees th,1!'
the historical [historisch] can never serve as a foundation because it is by
nature always secondary, never pri1llary,I~~ But Bousset also cl,linls th,]t
faith cannot be based on the historic [geschichtlich) appearance of]e:-ous of
Nazareth,l~5 Where Bousset wants to deny the possibility of basing f"ith
on either the results of historical research or the historic appearance of
Jesus of Nazareth, Wobbennin wants to make a distinction between these
two pOSSibilities. As Wobbermin puts it:
To lVant to entrust the security of our faith to historicll rest:,Hch b
for me an absolutely senseless undertaking, For that means noth
ing other than to give up the security ofthis faith al the outset. But
on the "historic appearance ofJesus of Nazareth" - more precisely
put: on the historic picture of the person of Jesus Christ, on the
picture of the person of ]t:sus Christ as history presents it to us in
order to establish faith, that appears 10 me, then, absolutt:ly to be
warranted, ifone does not understand this picture of the perSt)11 of
Jesus Christ as separate and unrelated to our own spiritual life, bUI

have some historic basis for faith.
13<)

~ousscl,

140

Ihld.

"I)ie Bedeutung Jcr Person!esu,"

305.
143.

Wobbermin, Gesd/;ehle lIlId f-listorie, 50.

(air, tloussel n<ver daillls thai h~ is allelllpting to JdellJ a specifically
I'rokS\;lIl1 undcrsldllding nr railh.
142. 'Ihese arc Ihe Ihree ligures wholll l30USSel acknolvleJges as influencing his own
thought <Jil the ralionall'olll1dation 01' religioil, Ibid., 2<)')-300

14-1. "DlIs Hislor;sehe kal/ll IItI/1/oglich als ellvas FWlIllIlllelll<l/es gelleJi, de/lll es is/
njehts Primares, som/em etll1as dlln:hallS SekwlIfiires." Ibid" 51.
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BOUSSd, "Die l3edeulung der Person !esu," 291-92.
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rather lJlcciscly in its relation to thiS our own srirituallife and in

the foundation of faith in reason because, in his estimation, Sausset has
inverted the proper relationship between reason and Gescllidlte. While
Sousset subordinates Geschichte to reason, Wobbermin insists that rca·
son must be subordinated to Geschieflte,
According to Wobbermin, reason must be: subordinated to (,'eschid'ie
because human reason is only exercised and developed within GesLhid,/c
and is therefore necessarily dependent on it. i(eason exists and functions
only within the realm of GeschiLhte precisely because hUilldn beings are
historic subjects standing within GeschiLhte. To rationalize religion - to
remove it from the realm of Gesdlichte and to place it above and beyond
Geschichte - is to give it up, because religion is irreducibly hisloric. I ""
Geschichte, not reason, is the realm of religious trUl h. for \:Vobberm i n,
the historic character of the Christian religion is rooted in the Ilis/oriL
picture of Jesus Christ as its creative: source. Sousset prefers to sl)edk or
the symbol of Christ as the creative source of the Christian religion. '1 he
person of Christ, he sugge:sts, transcends mere hisloricity and creates a
living symbol that is "more effective as poelry and truth" [h'1I1 as a his
toric figure. The symbol of Christ, according to Sousset, illustrates the
ultimate truth and reality lying behind the symbol. He paraphr<1ses Kant
to make precisely this point: "the symbol serves for illustration, not for
demonst ration,"lso
Wobbermin also appeals to Kant's proposition to illake his case
against Sousset's rationalization of religion, but he makes one import~lnt
addition. Kant suggested that the" Hiitorisclle" does nOl serve for 1he
demonstration, but for the illustration of truth. lSI Wabbermin revises
Kant's dictum to read, "Geschichte does not serve for a demonstration or
religiOUS truth, nor merely for its illustration; Geschichte serves ttlr the

ils signilicdncc for il.

llo

Aga In, Wobbc:r111 i n is concerned to establ ish the continu ity of the
historic flillure of Christ with its efficacy persisting in and through his
lory Ihe dhc .1CY of th is !lic'l me will persist regard less of historical inqui ry
inln its l)rigins, alld its value [IVerl] is based precisely on the fact that it
willll<:?rsi,st, regardless of the results of historical inquiry into its origins,
'Ihe v~due of lhe f'idure of Christ lies in its dependence on Geschichte,
speciflc.lily that it 1)((lVeS itselfro he historically [geschidillich] efficacious,
And this historic ef]iCdCY also proves that the picture is not merely the
product nf what Bllussel called "poetic fantasy."I.I~
Bolh Bnusset ~\I1d \:Voblwrmin agree that historical research cannot
l'rovide lhe fnUlld~ltion for failh, but they disagree on what should pro
vide Ih.1t Itllll1dation. I)ausset suggests that faith linds its foundation in
redson, whereas Wnbber1l1in suggests thelt the foundation is furnished by
C;cschic!Jlt.: CIS distinct frol11 J-/islorie) "in its significelnce for the personal
life 01 failh."I'~ Wobberl11in is unwilling to follo\v Sousset in securing
I.J(). "/\'1' IlisliJrisl !Jell Forscllllllg die Sidlerlleit IlIlseres G/alliJells allvertri.1llen IVoI·
I~II, dl/; iSI iiir lIIidl ""I sdda!Jtllill silllllvs~s UIII~rII~f1l11ell. Dellll das heiJ]! gar nichts
AIll./'Tes, dis
St, Ita!Jci! di~ses G"III/'ells VVII vomhereill pr~isgebeJl. Allf die 'geschic!Jtli
cite frsdlt'lllllllg kSIl "Oil N,,:"rcth' - gUll/ller gesprvc!Jell: aufdas geschichtliche PersolliJi/d
kSII Cllrisll, "lIrtl"s P,:r;oll!III" 0'011 Jesils C!Jrist/ls, wic es 11115 die Geschicflte zeigt, dell
C;/<lII/J,," :11 griilll/ell, .l"s >clteillt lIIir II II dllrc!JallS berec!Jtigt, wellil IJILlII dies PersOJlbiid
1'011 JCSJl.' Oil i.<tllS lIidIl <lI>!!t'SOll"ert jill' sidl 111/1./ I>ezidlLlIIgslos
ohlle BeziellLlIIg allf

",<'

"II

Jap/'

1I11)t.'" t';~('lIej

Gci:>{e;ddJCll, :>Vl/ciC1"1l genuie ill jelllt:,. Bf!zichUllg auf dieses IOljer eigenes
G~iSI('sl""cll '"111 ill scilla Be"elltllllgflir dasse/be." \'Vobbcrmill, G~scllichte IlIld Historie,
50
147. .AI this \-,nilll Ilmust be said Ihat\-,erha\-,s \oVobbermin has missed BOllssds \-,oinl.
1""lSoCI (\alilis Ihal thc sYlllb,,1 tIl' Christ as the \-,rodlici or \-,oetic fantasy rcmains the
Illc.lIlS by whic'h the <.:lcrnal truths of faith arc c<1nveyeLi tu human beings. vVobbcrrnill
LI"c, not \-,ut the dlicacy "I' Ihe \-'iLture uf Christ in terms of eternal truths immediatel)'
,I\'ailabk to rcao"n, but re(ers t" the dficacy uf the \-,icture of Christ within history as
the c'nduring value or the \-,idurc. Bnth Wobbermin and Bousset arrive at the same goal
(n11l1 diilcrcnt starting poillts. Yet Wobbermin insists that hi:; goal cannot be reached
through a pr"duct o( poetic LlIliasy, that hisllHic etilcacy is \-'roof that the picturc is not
Ih~ product of ['oelK fantasy but of a histuric ligure. It is difficult to see ho;v this is a valid
,1rgulllCIlt against Iloussct, or h,,,v historic efficacy /JIliSt have its origin in a historic figure
rather than In pOdry or sylllb,,1.

his religio-psychological method, which hc will develop rnure fully in Ilis threc·volliine
systematics (see Cha\-,ter 3, "Systematic Thcology according 10 the Religiu-I's),chuluglcal
Method").
149. Wobbermin, Gescllicrtte ulld Historie, 64.

150. Bousset, "Die Bedeutung del' Person ksu:' 305.

14X. "/),/; LlIlda~ Flillt/wlleill liej~rt die Gesc!Jichte. Die Geschicilte nallilieh, wie diesel'
Be)!riJF dllrdl ,"~ 1J~\I"U.ite Ulltersciteidllllg VO/JI Begrij!" del' Histurie Iliiller bestillllllt wirel.
Di"s~ G~sdlidlle in iltra Bedeut/lng pir Jus persollliche G/aulJensleben ist oder liefert das
1I0lige Flllltti/IlIt:llt." Ibid., 5:>-56 Wobhermin dlso suggests that this is the beginning of

151. Kant's original propOSition refers to the role of the historical in relating trulh:
"The historical [das Historische] serves only for illustratillll, not fill' den!lln'lratiull." 1'01'
the original pro\-,osition, see Kant, Luse Bliilter aliS Kants Nach/ajJ, 3:66 [ET: Nutes 111111
Fragmelltsj, In the third volume of his systematics, Wobberlllin sllgg.:slS thal, I<H K'\I1t,
dCiS Historische signifies Geschichte itself and not merely historical research. Wobbennin,
Systematisehe Theologie n<lch rdigiorlspsych%gischer Methode, vol. 3, Hb~n lind WIIl,rl,eit
des Christellllmls, 30S, n. I.
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itll'elliio/l of religious truth:';-" For Wobberlllin it is Geschichle, not rea

himself acknowledges, he is unwilling to follow Bousset's rational ;Ip

Ihd( is Ihc essential ,1nd permanent condition for the acquisition of

proach to secure a faith above the shifting results othistorical research.
After an extensive engagement with these fO!lr ligures - Lessing,

SOil,

rcligiou~

Irulh, bolh because ,111 truth is essentidlly historic and because

hUlll,1I1 bcings Jnd religion itself are irreducibly historic:
'1 his ~)i<lllrc of je,us Christ as ,1 hisloric figure is the norn1 and
nut l11el'cly thc symhol of the Christian religion. It does not serve
111<.:I·cly lUI' Ihe illustl"llion of Christian faith in Cod. It serves for
ils inVcl1tiul1 Jnd indeed in ,1 double res~)eet: it serves faith for its
pl'JltiL'al r<.:ligiuus life of faith as the way to the living Cod, and
it scrvcs theology for its theologic:al work as the I11dhodologic:al
I11C,1nS of a l110rc ~)rccise defi nit ion of the Ch rist ia n idea of God.
lillie-cd nol '10 ,1 doglllillic confession, hut also not only as a
~)l'llduCI ut I)Odic t'anlasy, hut rathel' as a confession of faith thdt
s<.:cks and finds lhe reveLltion of Cod in history do we adopt the
words: '1 he l.ogus becdille flesh alld we beheld his glory. Yes, we
nuy 'ldopt it t:\'cn 1110re wholeheartedly and say: 1he Logos be
C,1I11~ Ilt'sh ;1I1d we 'IdIOt" his glory. lei.'

Kahler, Herrmann, and Bousset - vVobberl11in hop"s that his own posi
tion has become clearer with respect to the problelll of faith and history.
He indicates that his own position lits somewhere between Kiihler's and
Herrmann's. This is consistent with his intention to lIlaillt.lin a historic
foundation for Christian faith, as opposed to the ra:iollalist alld dlltihis
torical tendencies of Lessing's and Bousset's positicl1s. Now lhal hc has
determined where he stands vis-a-vis similar positions frolll the ~)dS(, he
next turns his attention to a constructive sketch of his

OWII

position on

the problem of faith and history.

THE HISTORIC PICTURE OF /ESUSCHRIST
In a 19] 1 essay entitled "Psychologie und Erkennlni,kritik der religii)sen
Erfahrung:' Wobbermin emphasizes the historic chanCIer of Ihe eh rist idn

()J}

the bi1Sis of his conclusion, it is cledr that Wobberlllin is not will

ing to give lip Ihe im~)ortance of divine revelation in history in favor of a
purely rational or symbolic foundation for faith. And this is the primary
dilference bdween his position and Bousset's, despite many important
similarities. Houssct is willing to give up revelation as a historic event,
while Wobbermin insists that to give up historic revelation is to give up
the Christi.lIl religion. So in spite of many similarities, which Wobbermin

152. "Die Gexllidl/c dielll zwelr /lic/'t WI' DelilU/lslmtioll der re/igiosen Wuhrheil,
u/Jcr sic ,lielll ,mcrl /li( III 1,1<~! ZII ilIra IIlIIstmlioll; die Ceschidl/e ,/ie/ll zurlllvelltioll der
rdigiiisell Wullrlleil." VVllhh~lI11in, GeschiLhle IIJ1d f-Jislorie, 70. Emphasis mine. It is inter·
~slillg Ihat Wllhhcrillin C!WllSCS
(;crlll,ln'Tlfilldullg."

III

usc

th~

English word "Invention" here r<llher than the

153. "So i." dieS Bild JeSII ChriSli "Is geschie!l/iidle Gro/!e die Nurlil IIl1d lIichl bloj!
dil; Symbol (Ia e!lIisllidlCJI Religion. Es dieJlI lIichl bluf! wr IIIlIslm!ioll des chrisllichell
COllcsgll/l//lells. Es diclI! 311r IlIveJIlioJl dessdbell 1111(1 zwar dies ill doppeller Hinsichl: dem
CI<llIllell /iiI' s,iJl pmklise!l·r"hgioses G/ullbellslebeJl als Weg ZIIJ1'/ lebelldigell Call selbsl,
der Theolosie .fill' dll'e theologische ArlJeil als lJIet!w,}isches !'''fillet der Ni:i/'erbeslinlJlIlIlIg
des (/lrist/ie!lell GollesgeduJlkens. ZWl/r nid'l als doglllatise!res Bekelltltllis, abel' allch nichl
11111' als Er:ellgJlis die/llerisc/ler PIII/JlIl/sie, sUllderll als Bekel/Jllllis des die OJ}imbarl/l/g
C,llles ill der Ces(/I/e!lIe Sl/dlemlell Lll/d filldellell ClaLibells, eigJlell wir Llns das Worl all;
Del' Logos w"rd I''/eisch lIIlll wir s(,llell sellie Herdic/lkeit. Ja wir diil/ell es Ul1S )Judi n·ick·
h,ill/user alleigl/ell Wid sLigell: Da Logos ward FleiSch ///111 wir sehell seille Herrlichkeit."

Ihid, 72. 1-:mph,lslo in original.
70

religion and seeks to deline Christianity in its relation to Ge5chicllte and
in opposition to Historie:
Certainly genuine religion must be completely anJ unconditioil
ally free vis-ii-vis every merely historical tradition (ie., tr<ldilion
comprehensible only by means of historical rt:seard1), and it llluSt
therefore grant such research unconditional and :omplete fr<::e
dam. But this is not to say thai the link that immed dtely conn~cts
religion with Gesdlichle itself must be severed. R.ther, this link
may not be severed if religion itself is not 10 he harned in its mosl
proper essence.
For a relation to Geschichle helongs to the continued existence
of every genuine and healthy religion .... And in ChristiJnity the
relation to Gt:schichle is concentrated in the picture J[ ksus Christ
as it radiates outward toward us from the New Testamenl, as it is
available and comprehensible to every religiOUS experience inde
pendent of all historical criticism of the tradition. IS
\54. "Cewi}] J1I//fl eehte Religion geg<!lIiiber allee blufl hislori;e!lol d.h. II//r liIit dell
lvlille/n hislorischer ForschuJ1g .fLlflharen Oberliefer//ng gallz //J/l/llllliedillgi frei seill IlIld
sie nlllfl also sole'l,er FursehLlng IlJIhedillgle IlJId vollige Freih<!il ://;<?SIe!,<!II. Aller dWllil 1;1
dodl lIicht gesagl, du/3 a//ch dus die Religiull mit der Goschichle se/bsl IIJlmillellillr verklliip
!ende Band zersdlnill<!n werdell rIl//fl. Vie/meltr dar! dies Bandllh)11 zersc!lIIillell werel<!JI,
weJ1n niehl die Religion seibsl ill ihrem eigenslell Wesen verlelzl lVerdell sull. Dellll eille
Beziehl/ng wr Cesehiehte gehorl eben zwn B<!slallde aller echten Ill/I! gesllJldell Re/igioJl
hillZll.
Ulld im ChristenlWrl kOILzelllriert sich die Bezie!llIllg ,/II' ueselLiclLle ill delJl
71
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Wllbbermin admits that this position is otten misunderstood, espe
ci,lIly in terl1ls of the role or historical criticism. He argues for the unre
strickd access of historiul! criticism to the Christian tradition, including
the pici ur~' or jesus eh rist (ou nd in the New Testament. However, if th is
picture is lo be ,lVail,lble and COl11l)rehel1sible to religious experience, it
Illust be ill some sense also iml1lediately available, without first being
provided by historical research. The New Test,llnent picture of Christ
must be subjected 10 rigorous historical criticism, both in order to strip
aw,ly ,lilY false sllPIHlrtS (or faith and to allow the effects or efficacy of that
picture to shine thruugh the tradition 'lnd become immediately available
10 religiou~ experience. It is specifically the erred or efficacy of this picture
for religious experience that is independent of historical research and
rel1laillS ull<llfelled by it.
Here WobberJlli n's impl icit d ist inct ion between effect or efficacy and
f-lis/or;e becol1les vilally illlportant. Historical research can uncover or
rew,lI Ihe dfecls or etticacy of the New Testament picture o( Christ, but
Wohhennill insists that these effects are not thereby made the product
of histmic,lI rese,lrch 'Ille eti~cts or erncacy of the picture remain prior
,lJ1d superior to flij/orie, which serves onl)' the purpose of uncovering or
reve,lling the elleds so that they are immediately available to religious
experience.
Wobbermin's three "essenti'll elements" of the historic picture of
Christ (an serve as ,1 test case for this theory. Each of the three essential
eleillenls - Christ's ethical disposition toward love, his unity of will with
his heavenly rather, 'lnd his elevation to the Father following his SUffering
and death, along with the el-fects or efficacy of these elements in the pres
ent - exist prior [0 historical criticism of the New Testament texts, but it is
only by l1le,lnS of historical research that these three elements are isolated
from the remainder of the biblical picture of Christ. lss

The significance of the picture of Christ for religiOUS experience is
determined by religious experience itself 1io Historical reseclrch cannot
detract from the value of this picture because the relationship between
the historic figure of Christ and individual religiOUS experience is primar
ilya historic, not historical, relationship. 1l1is relationship exists prior to
historical inquiry into that picture and does not depelld on lhe results
of that inquiry for its value, It does not helve to do with ,1 historically
[hijtorisch] questionable figure from the past, but with a historic ligure
that is active and efficacious in the present: "For religious experience, the
New Testament picture of Christ is an illlmediately given historic ligure;
it maintains its value and its reality through its ejti:cI on the moral-reli
gious life.",;7
Again, the decisive question in this context is how this historic pic
ture of Christ is defined in order for it to remain independent of historic11
criticism. vVobberlllin suggests that individual eveMs and statemellts ill
the life of Jesus must be subjected to historical criticism, but thM the over
all impression, the main and decisive traits of the picture (and therefore
its effect or efficacy), are those stressed by the entire New Testament ,lnd
which therefore are a result of the power of the historic figure of ChriSt
himself, These main and decisive traits are the three "essential elements"
uncovered or revealed by historical research of the New Testamen[ texts.
The third trait is the most significant for Wobbermin, and it is rhis
trait that most clearly disti nguishes his posil ion from Herrmann's, for ex
ample. The resurrection belongs to the essential picture of Christ both be
cause Christian faith is always Easter faith in the risen Christ 'lild because
the resurrection is the basic presupposition of the entire New Testamenl.
There are many important historical considerations to be taken inro ac
count, most importantly whether the resurrection can be considered a
historical event at all. Wobbermin does not answer this queslion in his
early work and only discusses this aspect of the question much later, in

<':;

156. Th is is lhe beginning of Ihe so-call~J "rdigio- psyc!ln\ngical circle" I,.eli~iulI:;!,:;)'
chologischer Zirkel], which will be discllss~d in Il1nlT Jetail in Ibe nexi c!ldpler.

155. Ihis, Ihel1, i, why Wohhermil1 Call1101 dgree with Kilhler th,1I the historic Christ
Cd1111<>1 he sq.JJraled (rom Ihe biblicdl piclur~ o( him. The results of historical illv~sti
gdli\1I1 of Ihe Ne\v "I"<:'I,\l11eI11 lexlS lil1dlly J~mand such a Jistinction, in 'vVobbermin's
opinl\)J1.

157. "Fiir die religio:;e Erfahrung ;:;1 das neukslamellllic!-Je CllrisI1l51>i"/ oille 1/llIlIillel
bar gegebene ge:;chiclaliche Gro{Je; sie bewiilirt ihren Wert und ihre Wirkli(ilkeil (.Iurdl i1m'
Wirku/lg af/fda:; sittlich-religio:;o Leben." Emphasis mine. Wobhermin (urtha argues Ih<ll
this effecI on the moral-religiOUS lilt: is Ihe firsl dnJ 1ll0,t il11fJOrldnl crilerion (or evalu
ating th~ N~w Teslamenl piclure of Christ from a religious fJersfJ~clive. Wobberl11in,
Ce:;chichce rend Historie, 75-76.
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I3llde \"011 /e:;lI:; Cllri:;/u:;, !Vie e:; /III:; aLI:; dem Nellell Teslamelll elllgegellieLichtet Lind wie
1/1lCJ!-IJllillgig "Oil all.:r hisrurischell Kritik del" Ollerliefertlll!5 jeder religio:;el! ErJilhnmg
2I1gc:illg/1I h IIl1LlJu{;/wr i:;/." Wobbernlil1, "Psycbologie UI1J Erk~nl1ll1iskrilik Ja religiose
hfahrul1!S," 3-l~.
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his syslem"l ic Ihcnlogy_l ,,' In Cesdlidlte Lind f-/istorie his primary concern
is to ,-iJrify the esselltia\ traits of the historic picture of Christ found in
the New TcstJn1ent.
Ilut there is a more basic question that IIlUSt be raised in relation to
lhe historic 11iclure of Christ. namely. is it true? 'vVobbermin treats this
problem in three p,lns: tirst. ill terIllS of the actual question of truth; sec
ond. in terllls of I he question of the historic re,dity of the person of jesus
Chrisl; ami Ihird. in lerms of the question of historicity or of historical
com prehcnsi bi lit y. I;"
Is the New Testament picture of jesus Christ actually true? The reli
gious interest ill the picture of Christ is cOllcerned ouly with truth in the
slridesl, uitilllate sense. i.e_, ,1S eternal truth. It is not primarily a question
oflrulh as posed inlhe realm ofscientihc knowledge. which understands
truth in krllls of the highest possible probelbility. Relther, truth in this
case is ,1n .expression of the conviction of faith thelt the picture of Christ is
Cod's st:lf-I-evelalion. 'I helt the picture of Christ rq1resents and embodies
the sdf-reveldtion of Cod is always d conviction of faith, never of histori
cal klwwledge. lw
'I he decisive question for 'vVobbermin is the question of value, spe
cilicdlly the value of Ihis conviction of faith for the moral-religious life,lol
'the Christian world view is essentially and characteristically an ethical
world view becduse it hnds its ground and basis in a personal, ethical God
who is revealed in the person of jesus Christ. This conviction raises the
second, eC]u<llly decisive question of the historic reality of the picture of
Christ 1:01' Christiall faith the question of the reality of the picture of
Christ is !lot silllply collapsed into the question of its historicity or its
historical comprehensibility- The key to this question is the central role of
religious experience in Christi<ln faith:
I:m faith, the decisive: criterion for the unique historic reality of
!t'sus Christ is the fad that the corresponding conviction of faith.

Geschichte und Historie
as it finds expreSSion in cOl1ll1lunion with the exalted Lord, is the
surest and most effective guarantee for the truth of the picture 01'
Christ as the revelation of God, However, this is indef1endent of
the question of the historical comprehensibility of the person of
jt'sus Christ. 16~
Finally, for Wobbermill the questioll of historicity is uitilllcliely il'
relevant. It can be answered altirl1\cltivdy or'negatively Oil the I-usis of
historical research. but it cannot serve as the bc1sis for faith. Faith would
cease to be faith were il based solely on the results of hist'orical resecll',-h.
Although Wobbennill does Ilot put it ill such terlllS, (here is here a dis
tinction between the Illan jesus of Nazclreth behilld the lexts of the Nell'
Testelment and the New Testament picture of him. The Illan jesus of
Nazareth behind the New Testament texts is a shadowy hgure dnd call be
known only by historical research (and even then very little can be known
with any certainty), He becomes the historical jesus of modertl biogra
phy and historical research. The historic picture of Christ. as il confronts
Christians in and from the New Testalllent, is the Christ of r~lilh. 'rh"l
picture ultimately transcends the historical existence of jesus ofNaLareth.
Faith is not primarily interested in the man jesus of Nazareth; faith is
primarily interested in the three "essential elements" of the picture of the
historic Christ (particularly their effects and efticacy) hclllded down in the
New Testament and the Christian tradition,
According to Wobbel'lnin. Christian faith could withstand a negdlive
answer to the question of the historical existence of jesus o( Nazareth be
cause faith is Ilot ultimately concerned with l-listorie, but with Gesclliclltt.:.
As he puts it, "the historicity - the historical comprehenSibility - of jesus
is not an essential presupposition for the truth of the New Testament
picture of Christ at all."163 A faith that is b,1sed 011 the results of histori
cal research into the question of the historicity of jesus - whether lhal
historicity is altirmed or denied - ceases to be faith:

and nccessary Iruths, parliculal"iy Wubberlllin's insistence that Irutb has an irreducibly
ckl'llal character. Unforlun,ltdy neither there nor here does he offer an aJeljuate defini

162. "Oem GIlllllJeli isl dn; ell(,cheidende Kritaill/I/ Ii.ir die ge,ell/chr/idle
Einzelwirkliehkeil jesLi Christi da Ul/l,land, dalJ die ellt,<prechel/de G/III//,el/;iiiJerzcll1!lIl/g,
wie ;ie ;ich im Verkehr mil dem erlJohten Ham AlIsdfllek \'er;L!I<l{f1, die ,iel,er;!e IIl/d
wirkllngskrdftigsle Biirgscliaft ji'ir die Wahrheil de; Christllsui/des ,II; da 0tlel/lNlrllllg
GOlles isl. Oa; isl aua Lll/ahhiil/gig von del' Fruge IIC/eh Lia histori,L!,el/ FCljJlwrkeir der
Persoll fesLi Christi." I bid., 80.

lion of Clt'rnJllruth.
161. Ibid., 78ft'. II is" ljl1CSlion rdaleJ to his IhirJ Jdinition of Gesehiehte, as the
inkrrd"l](1I10f hUl11an bein~s as spiritual-nwral beings in their devdopment.

163. "Del/II 1I1/1ilngiillgliche VOTallS;elzwlg fiir die Wulirheit de, lIellte,ral1lwlliL!,el/
ChrislLlSbi/des i,l die Hi,torizitdt - die histori;che Fup/Jarkeit - je;1I itbaliClllfJl lIidll."
Ibid,84,

74

75

158. Wohhcrlllill, WeSeli /./rlll W"hrheit, 280fl'.

IS'!. Wohbcrlllill. Ge,dl;ehk

111/1/

Hi,lorie. 77-78.

16(). 'I his rccalls Wubberl11ill's criticisl11 of I.~ssing's dislinctiun between contingent
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WId

l-fisturie

'Ill duubt the: hist(l['icity of jesus signifies historical arbitrariness.
'1 he question of the historicity of jesus may and must be' affirmed
\\'ith the best histlHical conscience.
BUI I l1lay Ihlt and will not base l1ly faith on the affirmative
albWC[' tl) this question. For then it rests on l11y historical under
standing And faith would cease to be faith if it ",ere based on
historicalulll!e[·st,lIlding.
'lilliS, If nec'essary, f'lith would also be able CJll1lly to accert a
ncgativc ,lnswer to the question of the historicity of jesus Christ.

Christ and personal religiolls experience that will occupy Wobbermin for

It ,/ucs Ilui sllllld or!,iI/ 011 Ille IIffinliulive or lIegaiive UI1SIVer io this

the better part of his career. l11e distinction between Ges,-hic!lle, /-/istlllie,

(/lies/i(}II.I"~

For the Christian religion is that religion, thaI form 01 highest
phase of religious life, which caille i!lto existence under the im
pression of the picture of the person of jeSllS Christ and which has
its permanent norm in just this piclure of the [)erson,d and salvilic
life of Jesus Christ, the norm namely for its individual forms of
embodiment as well as the norl1l for its historic deve!opmcn1. 1o;
It is this question of th~ relationship between the historic piLlure of

and WirkLtng or Wirks£1l11keit serves as the foundation of the religio,

'I he only legitimate historical question in this matter, as vVobbermin

psychological method that he developed in his three-volume s)'Slem,llic

sees it, is the question of the Christian tradition itself. Christian Faith can

theology and defended in a series of Streilsc!lrifrell directed against Karl

trdce itselF odck to the hrst Christi8ns and throughout its history con

Barth and dialectical theology. It is to this method, and more specifically

sistently refers

to what Wobbeflnin called the "religio-psychological circle:' tildl we now

10

d historic personality. Because the historicity of Jesus

uf NdDlI'eth is neither historically comprehenSible nor theologically rel

turn.

eVdnl, according to 'vVoboerll1in, the question oFthe unbroken succession
of Christian sclf-cnnsciollsness leading back to the first Christians, in
which lile New Testdl11ent picture of Christ remains immediately present
allLl aVdilable to religious experience, becomes the decisive question. But
it is lhe questinn of Ceschichte, not of Historie, that is finally decisive for
Christidn fdith:

I ()~. "Die Ili,{('rt:iliil jesli Z/I "ezweiJelll, bedeLitel 11I51Ori,che \Nil/kiir. Die Frage lI<.Icll
cia rt/jl""izi/'~I je511 dUlf II lid IIlllp lIlillie;leilI h/5luri5chelll Cewi,5eII !iejelhl werdell. Aber
lIleiliCII G/i/II/'\'1I cI'lIf WId will iell allf die Beil1hlllIS die5er Frage lIicht griinJell, Deml
sie IJentll! Illlf lIl\'iller 11I5lurisel,elI EilISiellt. Ulld der Clewbe wiirde au/horell, C/i/llbe zu
5eilI, welllI or 'lUI' Ilisluri5e1le Eillsichl gegriilIdet wiirde. Also wiirde der Glaube auell die
\'el'lleilIIllig cia Fmge 1It/c!1 der I-hsloriziliil je;u CilrUi segebellelIfaL/s rltllig hilIlIellmell
kiilIlIeli. Er ;Ie/,I IiIl1i )LillI lIiehl lIlit der l3eji/I/lllIg oder Vemeilll/llg die;er Fnlge:' IbiJ"
81. Fillph'lsis III origin,d. In light of [his alnrmatioll of the ultimate irrelevance of the
hi,toric,ll comprehensibil it I' of the existence of Jesus of Nazareth anJ whal thai means or

docs [WI meall for Christian f,lith, \Nobbermin's criticisms of Drews come into sharper
focus. While Ilrews clJlKludeJ from the h[storical incomprehensibility of Jesus thaI he
did not exi'l '11 all, Wobbcrrnin concludes from the perspective anJ the presuppositions
of Christiall faith Ihat the histl1ricit)' of Jesus is not the primar)' yuestion. The primary
quc'stioll [s the e!licacy of the New Testaillent picture of Christ, <InJ thaI question must
[lot bc' coliapscJ into the ljucstilHl of historical comprehensibility. Drewsalld 'vVobberrnin
both agrec that the existence Ill' jesus of Nazareth can[1\11 be JemonstrateJ with absolute
certainly by historical rc'carch, but they Jisagree on what thai Illeans for Christian faith.
AnJ th,lt " the impor[anl qUt'stiO[I, atieasl for YVobberrnin.

165. "De til I die christ/iche Religiun ist diejellige Religioll, dieienige Foml oder St/lfe/lJ/(jho
religiiisen Lebens, die /In/a de/'ll Eindruck des Persollbi/des jes/I Chn;1 i olltsl£ll/deli isl 111111
an eben diesem BiLde des Pasol/' II/'Id Hei/al/dslelJetls je;u Christi ihre hle//Jel/lle NOI'II1 h<ll,
Jie Norm niillllich fiir illre illdivid/le/lel/ Au;gesta/tulIgsforllletl sOll'ie die Norm (fir tI,re
geschichtliclle Elitwick/wig" Ibid" 86.
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